State of Utah, by and Through Its Attorney General, Phil L. Hansen v. Salt Lake City, Utah, A Municipal Corporation, by and Through Its Board of Commissioners, Mayor J. Bracken Lee, and Commissioners George B. Catmull, Louis E. Holley, Conrad B. Harrison, and James L. Barker; Its Chief of Police, Dewey Fillis; and/Or Its License Assessor, Thad Emery : Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
State of Utah, by and Through Its Attorney General,
Phil L. Hansen v. Salt Lake City, Utah, A Municipal
Corporation, by and Through Its Board of
Commissioners, Mayor J. Bracken Lee, and
Commissioners George B. Catmull, Louis E.
Holley, Conrad B. Harrison, and James L. Barker; Its
Chief of Police, Dewey Fillis; and/Or Its License
Assessor, Thad Emery : Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. SLC, No. 11047 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3325
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its AT-
TORNEY GENERAL, Phil L Hansen, . 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
- vs -
' 
Appeal from~.·· ... 
of the District Court of 8d ... 
Honorable A1don J. · 
PAUL S. GRANT 
Assistant City Attomey F I -
414 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
I 
: I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF CASE ____ ---------------------------------------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT -------------------- 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------ 3 
STATEMENT OF FAC'T'S ___ ----------------------------------------- 3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ST ATE HAS RESERVED TO ITSELF 
ALONE ITS INHERENT AND PLENARY 
5 
POLICE PO\VER TO REGULATE LIQUOR. ____ 5 
POINT II. 
THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
VAGUE. ______________ --------------------------------------------------------- 44 
POINT III. 
THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
DISCRIMINATING. __ ----------------------------------------------- 47 
POINT IV. 
THE ORDINANCE IS AN UNCONSTITUTION-
AL INFRINGEMENT ON THE RIGHTS OF 
CONTRACT OF THE STATE BY ITS CHAR-
TERS TO LOCKER CLUBS. ------------------------------------ 51 
POINT V. 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIM-
INATION. _______________________ ----------------------------------------- 52 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
POINT VI. 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT A G A I N ST ILLEGAL 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. -------------------------------- 53 
POINT VII. 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS. ____________ 54 
CONCLUSION ________________________ ------------------------------------------- 54 
APPENDIX ____________________________________ ------------------------------------ A-1 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
American Fork City v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134 Pac. 
739 (1913) -------- ---- - -------------------------------------- -------- 9, 10 
American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 
249 (1930) ------------- ------ -------- ------------------------ 10, 13, 17 
American Petroleum Co. v. Ogden City, 90 Utah 465, 
62 P.2d 557 (1936) __________ ---------------------------------------- 10 
Anderson v. Nick, 402 Ill. 508, 84 N.E.2d 394 (1949) ____ 30 
Arnold v. City of Chicago, 387 Ill. 532, 56 N.E.2d 795 ____ 32 
Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 69 Cal. App. 2d 639, 160 
P.2d 37 (1945) ____________________ --------------------------------------- 15 
Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 
556 (1947) ----- --------------- -- --- ------------------------------------ 43 
Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591, 81 
A.L.R. 215 (1932) ______________ ------------------------------ 10, 13 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 Sup. Ct. 
1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967) ______________ --------------- 53 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Carter v. State Tax Comm'n, 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727, 
731, 126 A.L.R. 1402 0939) ............................ 14, 16, 27 
Citizen's Club v. Welling, 83 Utah 81, 27 P.2d 23 
(1933) ............. ................. ............................................ 36 
City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347, 45 N.E.2d 
852, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 756, 63 Sup. Ct. 1175, 
87 L. Ed. 1709 ........................................................... 32 
City of Butte v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. 18, 75 Pac. 521, 
30 Am. St. Rep. 698 (1904) ............................ 14, 16, 27 
City of Lyndhurst v. Compola, 169 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1960) .. ... ............ ............... .......................... 30 
City of Miami v. Kichinko, 22 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1945) .... 30 
City of Pineville v. Tarver, 231 La. 446, 91 So.2d 597 
( 1956) ........... .............................................................. 30 
City of Tacoma v. Keisel, 68 Wash. 685, 124 Pac. 137, 
139 (1912) ...................... ............................................. 43 
City of Tulsa, Okla. v. Midland Valley R.R., C.C.A. 
Okla., 168 F.2d 252 . . ................................................. 32 
Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, 622, 
16 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1950) ................................ 14, 16, 27 
Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n, 104 Utah 365, 
140 P.2d 335 (1943) ............................................... 6, 10 
Entre Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 
670 ( 1955) ............................................................ 35, 36 
Four-S Razor Co. v. Guymon, 110 Kan. 745, 205 Pac. 
635 .................................................................................. 36 
Gordon v. City of Indianapolis, 204 Ind. 79, 183 N.E. 
124 (1932) ............. ·····. ············································· 14 
Hom Moon Jung v. Soo, 64 Ariz. 216, 167 P.2d 929, 
930 (1946) .......... ......................................................... 14 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
In re Jones, 78 Ala. 419, 421 ( 1885) _______ _ 13 
In re MacLauchlan, 9 F.2d 534, 535 (2d Cir. 1925) ________ 13 
Jones v. Logan City, 19 lTtah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 
(1967) --- ------------ - - -------- ----- - -------------- - ------------ 46 
Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 
(1957) --- - -------- ---------- ---- -------- ------- -------------- 36, 37 
Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 Pac. l, 
45 L.R.A. 628 (1899) ____________________________________________ 7, 11 
Lagoon Jockey Club v. Davis County, 72 Utah 405, 270 
Pac. 543 (1928) ___ __ __ _ ______ _____________ _ _____ _____ _ _______ __ 43 
Larsen v. Salt Lake City, 44 Utah 437, 141 Pac. 198 
( 1914) ----- ------------- ------------ ---- ---------------------------------------- 8 
Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935) 10 
Marchetti v. United States, 388 U.S. 904, 88 Sup. Ct. 
697, 19 L. Ed. 2d 8~9 (1968) ___ __ _____ _________ _______ ____ 53 
Mayor v. Randall, 67 Ariz. 369, 196 P.2d 477 (1948) _ _ 30 
Morgan v. Salt Lake City, 78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510 
( 1931) -------------- --------- -------------- --------------------------------- 10 
Munoz v. City of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. 
1958) -------------------------- ------------ - ------------ ---------------------- 30 
Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 
777 ( 1944) -- -- ---- --- --- --------- -- -- -- --- ---------- ----- 10, 17 
Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 
(1952) ____ : _______ ------- ---- ------ ---- -- - ---- ----------- --- -- - 9, 17 
Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah 882, fi9 Pac. 524, 77 Am. St. 
Rep. 917 (1899) _ __ _ _____ ---------------------------------------- 11 
Nephi City v. Forrest, 41 Utah 433, 126 Pac. 332 (1912) 22 
Ogden City v. Bear Lake & River, etc., Co., 16 Utah 
440, 52 Pac. 697, 41 L.R.A. 30F> (1898) _ __ ----- 11 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Ogden City v. Boseman, 20 Utah 98, 57 Pac. 843 (1899) 11 
Ogden City v. Crossman, 17 Utah 66, 53 Pac. 985 
( 1898) ----- ---- -------- -· ------------------- ----------- ------------------------- 11 
Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Vtah 556, 182 Pac. 30 (1919) 
----- --- ______________________________________________ 9, 10, 14, 16, 27, 43 
Park v. Rives, 40 Utah 47, 119 Pac. 1034 (1911) ____________ 38 
People v. DeYoung, 39 Cal. Reptr. 598 (Super. Ct. 
1964), aff'd, 39 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Dist. Ct. App. 
1964) -----------------------------------------------------------------------·---- 30 
Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 41 Utah 154, 125 Pac. 
389 (1912) ------------------------------------------------ 10, 22, 50, 52 
Provo City v. Provo Meat & Packing Co. ,49 Utah 528, 
165 Pac. 477, 479 Ann. Cas. 1918 D 530 (1917) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14, 16, 27 
Retan v. Salt Lake City, 63 Utah 459, 226 Pac. 1095 
(1924) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
Revene v. Trade Com'n, 113 Utah 155, 195 P.2d 563 
(1948) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
Rich v. Salt Lake City, No. 11117, D. Utah, Feb. 20, 
1968 ---------------------- ·-------------------------------------------------9, 10, 17 
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 
179, 51 P.2d 645 (1935) ___________________________ 10, 30, 50, 52 
Ritholz v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 385. 284 P.2d 702 
(1955) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
Roe v. Salt Lake City, No. 10974, D. Utah, Jan. 23, 
1968 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 14, 50 
Salt Lake City v. Allred, 19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P.2d 371 
( 1967), reversed on point of preemption on rehear-
ing, Salt Lake City v. Allred, No. 10752, D .Utah, 
Feb. 9, 1968. _______________________________________________________ 9, 12, 39 
Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas & Oil Co., 80 Utah 530, 
15 P.2d 648 ( 1932) -----------------------------------·---------------- 10 
Salt Lake City v. Bernhagen, 56 Utah 159, 189 Pac. 
583 (1920) --------- --------------------- -------------------------------- 8, 10 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Salt Lake City v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 52 
Utah 540, 175 Pac. 654 (1918) -------------------------------- 10 
Salt Lake City v. Doran, 42 Utah 401, 131 Pac. 636 
( 1913) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9, 10 
Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 Utah 170, 106 Pac. 705 
(1910), Ann. Cas. 1912 C 189. -------------------------------- 9, 10 
Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 
(1938) --------------- ---------------------------------------- 9, 10, 12, 39 
Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537, 
539, (1942) ------------------------•--------------------------- 14, 16, 27, 43 
Salt Lake City v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 359, 
359 P.2d 397 (1961) -------------------------------------------------- 9 
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 Pac. 234 
( 1923) ---------------------------------- ------- ---------------------------------- 10 
Salt Lake City v. Towne House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 
2d 417, 424 P.2d 442 (1967) ___________________ 18, 38, 39, 40 
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 134 
Pac. 560 (1913) ----------------------------- ___________ __________________ 10 
Simpkins v. State, 35 Okla. Crim. 143, 249 Pac. 168 
(1926) ----------------- ------------------------ ----------------- 14, 16, 27 
State ex rel. Cox v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 
21 Utah 401, 60 Pac. 1013 (1900) ---------------------------- 8 
State ex rel. Hollywood Jockey Club v. Stein, 133 Fla. 
530, 180 So. 863 ___________________ -------------------------------------- 43 
State ex rel. Nichols v. Cherry, 22 Utah 1, 50 Pac. 1103 
(1900) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
State ex rel. Stein v. Christensen, 84 Utah 185, 35 P.2d 
77 5 ( 1934) ----------- ----- ------------------------------------------------ 7 
State v. Alta. Club, 120 Utah 121, 232 P.2d 759 (1951) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------4, 32, 33, 41 
State v. Frederic, 28 Ida. 709, 155 Pac. 977 (1916) ____ 24 
State v. Goss, 79 Utah 559, 11 P.2d 340 (1932) ____________ 8 
State v. Geurts. 11 Utah2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961) ____ 46 
State v. Haswell, 414 P.2d 652 (Mont. 1966) --·------------- 30 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941) 6 
State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920, 117 A.L.R. 
330 ( 1938) -------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 7 Utah 2d 28, 317 P.2d 
597 ( 1957) --------------------------- ---------------------------------------- 9 
Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 
197 P.2d 477, appeal denied, 336 U.S. 930, 69 Sup. 
Ct. 739, 93 L. Ed 1090 ( 1948) -------------------------------- 7 
Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734 
( 1936) -------------- -------- ---- ---------------- ------------------------------ 6 
Tooele v. Hoffman, 42 Utah 596, 134 Pac. 558 (1913) ____ 9, 10 
United States v. Souders, 27 Fed. Cas. 1267, 1269 
( 1871) -- ---- ---- ---- ------------------------------------------------------------ 13 
United States v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas, 631, 633 (1852) 13 
Utah Mfr's Ass'n v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 229 
( 1933) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8, 37 
Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 
58 P.2d 1 (1936) ---------------------------------------------------- 10, 17 
Van Eaton v. Town of Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N.W. 
475, 71 A.L.R. 820, 43 C.J. 197, n. 19 ------------------------ 32 
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 
161 (1933) ---------- --------------------------------------------- 10, 50, 52 
Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 
P.2d 724 (1939) _______ ------------------------------------------------ 10 
Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 526 (1935 ---------------------------- 8 
Young Constr. Co. v. Dunne, 123 Kan. 176, 254 Pac. 
323 (1927) ----------- -------------------------------------------------------- 36 
Young v_ Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 321, 67 Pac. 1066 
( 1902) --------- -------- ------------------------------------------------- 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Zamata v. Browning, 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 (1918) 
··-··--···-··-··--------------- ----·----------------------10, 18, 20, 24, 50, 52 
Texts 
37 Am. Jr. 722 9 
Bible, King James Version ________ ----------------------------------··--- 18 
Book of Mormon ___________________________ ---------------------------------- 18 
C.J.S. Const. Law § 175 ----------------------·---·----------------------· 8 
16 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 119 ___________ ---------------------------------·-- 17 
16 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 135 -----------------------------------------·------ 17 
16 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 139 --------------------------- ---·--·-----·--·---- 17 
16 C.J.S. Const. Law§ 140(b) -----------------·-------------------------- 9 
62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 107 _________ ·-----------·---··-···--··-------- 9 
62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § llO(b) -------·- ----··--·----------------- 9 
62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 120 ______________ ···-------------- __________ 32 
62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 143(b) -----------------------------·------ 9, 39 
82 C.J.S. Statutes 901 ---------------·-·-------- ----------·-------------·---- 41 
1 Dillon, Mun. Corps. § 237, at 448 (5th ed.) ____________ 9 
1 Dillon, Mun. Corps. § 237 _________ ··--------------------- ---·----·- 11 
1 Dillon, Mun. Corps. § 154 -------------------------------------------- 11 
Doctrine & Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day· Saints, Word of Wisdom, § 89 ____________ 18 
1 McQuillan, Mun. Corp. 387 (2d ed.) ---------------------------- 9 
Pearl of Great Price -------·--·----------- --· _ ------------------------------- 18 
Random House Dictionary of the English Language 
(unabr. ed 1966) ______________ ·--- -----------------------· 13, 14, 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Webster's Ne wlnternational Dictionary (unabr. 3d ed. 
1966) ---------- -------- ------------------------------------------------ 13, 14, 15 
Constitutions 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV ________ -------------------·--··--·---------------· 53 
U.S. Const. Amend. V ·------------------ ------------------------ 49, 53, 54 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV ---------------------------------------------- 49, 54 
U.S. Const. Amend. XVIII ------------------------------------------------ 25 
U.S. Const. Amend. XVIII, § 2 -----------------------------------···-· 25 
U.S. Const. Amend. XXI ---------------------------------------··········- 28 
U.S. Const. art. I § 10 ----------------------------·-····--------------------51, 52 
Utah Const. art. I, § 2 ----------········-··--··-·····-----------------6, 8, 53 
Utah Const. art. I, § 3 ----------------------------------------------------5, 54 
Utah Const. art. I, § 7 ------------------------------------------------8, 49, 54 
Utah Const. art. I, § 10 _______ ---------------------·-················· 54 
Utah Const. art. I, § 12 ------·····-···-·--··--··--·--·····-··-········-49, 5  
Utah Const. art. I, § 14 ··-··--·--·-------------------········-··········-·· 53
Utah Const. art. I, § 18 -------------··--··-··-··-·-··-········-······----51,52 
Utah Const. art. I, § 24 ---------------------------······--·-··········-·-·· 4 
Utah Const. art. I, § 27 --------·-········--·--·-··················-······-· 49 
Utah Const. art. V, § 1 -------------------------------···-··-·············· 6, 8 
Utah Const. art. XI, § 5 ·---------------------------------------8, 9, 46, 49 
Utah Const. Preamble ___ -----------------------····························· 6 
Sess. Laws of Utah 1925, ch. 11, § 1 -------------------------------- 15 
Laws of Utah 1882, ch. 2 ------------------------------------------------ 21 
Laws of Utah 1882, ch. 3 ------------------------------------------------ 20 
Laws of Utah 1882, ch. 28 ______________________________________________ 20, 21 
Comp. Laws of Utah 1884, § 1775 -------------·-····-············20, 21 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Sess. Laws of Utah 1888 § 1775, subd. 41 ________________________ 21 
Rev. Stat. of Utah 1898, § 206, subd. 41 ------------------------ 21 
Comp. Laws of Utah 1907, § 206, subd. 41 _ __________________ 21 
Sess. Laws of Utah 1911, ch. 106, § 48 ________________________ 22 
Sess. Laws of Utah 1911. ch. 106, § 48 ---------------------------- 21 
Sess. Laws of Utah 1911, ch. 106, § 61 ---------------------------- 22 
Sess. Laws of Utah 1911, ch. 106, subd. 68 ____________________ 22 
Sess. Laws of Utah 1917, ch. 2, § 39 ---------------------------- ___ 23 
Sess. Laws of Utah 1917, ch. 2, § 40 ------------------------------·- 23 
Sess. Laws of Utah 1935, ch. 43 ____________________________________ 28, 29 
Laws of Utah 1955, ch. 25 § 2, 3 and 4 ________________________ 40 
Laws of Utah 1963, ch 17, § 2(1) __________ ------------------------- 49 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. Vol. I (195J) ____________________________________________ 6, 18 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 63-3-5 ( 1959) ________________ 43 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. (1962) 
§§ 10-8-1 to -85 (1962) ------------- ------------------------------ 12 
§ 10-8-42 -- ----- 5, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17' 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, '28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 41, 42, 43, 46, 49 
10-8-81 ----------· 5, 12, 13, 17, 18, 26, 30, 31, 37, 38, 39, 
. 41, 42,43,44,49 
10-8-84 ----------- ------------------------------------------------9, 12, 13, 49 
11-10-2 --------------- -- -------- -- ____________ .4, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51 
11-10-3 .. ------------ --------------- ___________________ .4, 18, 48, 49, 50 
11-10-4 -- ------------------------- -----··---------------4, 18, 48, 49, 50 
16-6-13 --- ------ --- ---- -- --- 18, 28, 33, 38, 40, 46, 48, 49, 50 
16-6-13.1 --------------- 4, 18, 28, 31, 33, 34, 38, 40, 46, 48, 
49, 50, 51 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
16-6-13.2 ------- ___ _4, 18, 28, 31, 34, 35, 38, 40, 46, 48, 
49, 50, 51 
16-6-13.3 ___________ _4, 18, 28, 31, 34, 35, 38, 40, 48, 50, 51 
16-6-14 --------------------------- - _______________________________________ 34, 35 
16-6-15 --------·- --·--·-- ---··-------··--·-----·-··············--·---····34, 5 
tit. 16, ch. 6 ____________ ------------------------------········------------ 49 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. (1966) 
34-4-17 ------- -- ---------------- ------------- ---------------------- ----------···· 31 
32-7-13 -------------------------------------------------------------------····· 32 
32-8-46 -------------- ------··--------------··--·-------·-·········-·········-·· 32 
32-8-4 7 --------·-----· --------··--------·--·-·-·····--·-··-·-·················· 32 
tit. 32 -----··------·-·--·-·····---·--·······--·-·---·······-················ 4, 48 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1967) 
11-10-1 -- ------- ____________ .4, 5, 12, 13, 17, 18, 39, 40, 41, 
42, 47, 48, 49, 50 
16-6-19 ( 3) ------- ·-·---·-·-----------·---·---······························ 45 
16-6-21 --------··----------------·-···-·········--································· 46 
Ordinances 
Rev. Ord of Salt Lake City, Utah (1965) ·---·····-······-····· A-1 
Tit. 9, ch. 4 ________________ ---------------------·--··········-·-·····--············· 49 
Tit. 19, ch. 1-25 -------·-······----··--·--···-····-································· 49 
Tit. 20, § 29-
20-29-1 --------------- ·- -------·-·----····-····-······----··--····-·--·······--·--· 44 
20-29-2 ----------------·---·-- ·------·---····-----·--·---·--·····-·········-··-····· 47 
20-29-3 --------··-----·--·--·--·---·-··----------------·--···--·--·-··--··.47, 48, 51 
20-29-4 ------------------·-·---·------·--·-·--··--·-----·--·--····-······-.47, 8, 51 
20-29-5 ------------------------··--·--·-----·--··-----········----·········-.47, 48, 51 
20-29-6 ---·---------------------------------------·--·---·-··-·····--·-·····.47, 48, 51 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
20-29-7 -------------------------------------- -------- ----------- _______ _47, 48, 53 
20-29-8 ---------------------- ---------------------------------- ___________________ _4 7' 48 
20-29-9 ------------------- ----- ---------------- ____________________ _47, 48, 51, 53 
20-29-10 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 50 
20-29-11 --- ------------------- --- ------- ----- ______________________________ _47, 48 
20-29-19 ------------------------------------- ______________________________ _4 7' 48, 51 
20-29-20 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53 
20-29-22 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54 
20-29-23 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 51 
20-29-24 47 
Others 
Enabling Act § 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
Pres'd Proc. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 
U.S. Congressional Act, Sept. 9, 1850 _____________________ _ ________ 18 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its AT-
TORNEY GENERAL, Phil L. Hansen, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, a municipal 
corporation, by and through its BOARD 
OF COMMISSIONERS, Mayor J. Bracken 
Lee, and Commissioners George B. Cat-
mull, Louis E. Holley, Conrad B. Harrison, 
and James L. Barker; its CHIEF OF 
POLICE, Dewey Fillis; and/or its LI-
CENSE ASSESSOR, Thad Emery, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
11047 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant 
NATURE OF CASE 
The State of Utah sought a declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief against Salt Lake City in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, seeking to be 
declared unconstitutional and unauthorized by the 
statutes of the State of Utah a municipal ordinance 
enacted by Salt Lake City which purports to regu-
late and license all nonprofit clubs which allow the 
consumption of beer and liquor by the members 
on the premises. 
2 
In this brief, the State of Utah will be referred 
to as the State; Salt Lake City will be referred to as 
the City; the municipal ordinance will be referred 
to as the Ordinance: and the nonprofit clubs will 
be referred to as the locker clubs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted a temporary restrain-
ing order, later superseded by a preliminary in-
junction .. prohibiting the enforcement of the Ordi-
nance pending the declaratory judgment. 
The City moved to dismiss the complaint on the 
grounds that it did not state a cause of action on 
which relief could be granted; and that the Attorney 
General was not a proper party to seek the relief 
for and on behalf of the State. The lower court de-
nied the motion to dismiss and ordered the City to 
file its answer and to proceed. After considering 
oral arguments and written memoranda, the lower 
court filed its Memorandum Decision, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Declaratory Judg-
ment. 
The Dfstrict Court of Salt Lake County, Judge 
Aldon J. Anderson, holding that the Ordinance was 
neither in contravention of law nor an unconstitu-
tional extension of power by the City, vacated the 
preliminary injunction; and denied any further in-
junctive relief, except for extending for but two days 
the effective date of the vacated preliminary injunc-
tion to permit the State to file with this Court a 
3 
motion for injuncive relief pending this appeal. The 
motion by the State to have this Court enjoin the 
City from attempting to enforce the Ordinance 
pending this appeal was denied without notice or 
hearing. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State seeks a reversal of the judgment of 
the lower court by having this Court construe and 
restrain the Ordinance and its enforcement as being 
unconstitutional and unauthorized by the statutes 
of the State of Utah insofar as the Ordinance pur-
ports to extend to the City powers which have not 
been granted to the City; i.e .. inherent and plenary 
police power which have been reserved to the 
State itself alone, attempting to ensure to all of the 
people throughout all of the State of Utah a consti-
tutionally uniform operation of the very comprehen-
sive State Liquor Control Act. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City enacted the Ordinance, purporting to 
regulate and license all nonprofit clubs. However, 
a casual glance will disclose that the city enacted 
the Ordinance, attempting to regulate and license 
only some nonprofit clubs. The nonprofit clubs 
which allow the consumption of beer and liquor by 
the members on the premises, the so-called locker 
clubs, constitute the sole collective target intended 
to be hit by the application of this Ordinance. 
4 
Contending that it has reserved to itself alone 
its inherent and plenary police power to regulate 
liquor, by enacting and amending the State's very 
comprehensive Liquor Control Act, the State of Utah 
brought this action against Salt Lake City; by and 
through the Attorney General, as the chief law en-
forcement officer of the State (See State of Utah, by 
and through its Attorney General v. Alta Club, 120 
Utah 121 at 134, 232 P.2d 759, 766 (1951)); to have 
construed and restrnined the Ordinance and its en-
forcement; attempting, as required by law (Utah 
Const. art I, § 24), to assure to all of the people 
throughout all of the State of Utah a constitutionally 
uniform operation of the State's very comprehen-
sive Liquor Control Act; contending that there could 
be no uniform operation of the State's very compre-
hensive Liquor Control Act if the courts of this State 
were to condone local usurpation of state-reserved 
police power, by potentially permitting each of the 
29 counties and each of the 202 cities and towns 
within the State of Utah to enact and enforce its 
own peculiar ordinance that might not be in com-
pliance with the State's very comprehensive 
Liquor Cont r o 1 Act. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann. tit: 32; and as amended; Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 16-6-13.1. 16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962); Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967); and 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §~ 11-10-2, 11-10-3, and 
11-10-4 (1962). 
A copy of the Ordinance to be construed by 
this Court was included by reference in the com-
plaint as Exhibit A. (R. 25-27.) 
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As a convenience to this Court, a copy of the 
Ordinance has also been included as an appendix 
to this brief. Inserted therein are condensed obser-
vations by the State, supported by legal authority, 
alleging some invalidities of certain sections of the 
Ordinance. 
The City relies on a combination of three 
statutes for its power to enact and enforce the Ordi-
nance: 
1. Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962); 
2. Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962); 
and 
3. Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 
1967). 
These statutes will be discussed in detail as 
each relates to the Ordinance and points of argu-
ment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE HAS RESERVED TO ITSELF 
ALONE ITS INHERENT AND PLENARY 
POLICE POWER TO REGULATE LIQUOR. 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
United States, and the United States Constitution 
is the supreme law of the Nation. (Utah Const. art. 
I, § 3.) 
The Utah Constitution, subordinate only to the 
United States Constitution, is the supreme law of 
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the State. (Enabling Act § 3; Pres'l Proc., Utah Code 
Ann. Vol. I 0953); Duchesne County v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943).) 
The Utah Constitution is a framework erected 
by the people of the State, in whom all political 
power of the State is inherent (Utah Const. art. I, § 
2), setting up a form of sovereign government 
whereby and through which the people of the 
State may act collectively in matters of common 
concern throughout the State, wherein from their 
nature action by individuals or local instrumentali-
ties of the State (e.g., cities) would not be orderly 
or effective, matters in which all of the peop]e 
.throughout the State have a common interest, but 
not necessarily a common point of view, remedy, 
or solution. (Utah Const. Preamble; State v. John-
son. 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941).) 
The Utah Constitution divides the powers of the 
government of the State of Utah into three distinct 
branches: legislative,· executive, and judicial. (Utah 
Const. art. V, § I; Tite v. State Tax Comm'n, 89 Utah 
404, 57 P.2d 734 (1936).) 
The executive and judicial powers have no 
paramount. applicability to issues of this case and 
for that reason will not here be discussed without 
specifity. All further refera.ls in this brief are in-
tended to relate to the legislative power of govern-
ment. 
The Utah Constitution vests in the Legislature 
and, under circumstances therein specified, in the 
people of the State all legislative power of govern-
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ment to enact. amend, and repeal any and all State 
regulations and rules of law called statutes on any 
subject within the sphere of government through-
out the State as to which there is no constitutional 
restraint or as to which there is no constitutional 
mention. (Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers. 
114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477, appeal denied, 336 U.S. 
930, 69 Sup. Ct. 739, ~3 L. Ed. 1090 (1948); State ex 
rel. Stein v. Christensen, 84 Utah 185, 35 P.2d 775 
(1934); State ex rel. Nichols v. Cherry, 22 Utah 1, 50 
Pac. 1103 (1900); Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 
368, 57 Pac. 1 (1899).) 
The legislative power of the State is divided 
into three fields: eminent domain, revenue, and 
police. (State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P."2d 920, 117 
A.L.R. 330 (1938).) 
Eminent domain power, the legislative power 
to condemn private property for public purposes, is 
not applicable to this brief and for that reason will 
not here be discussed. 
Revenue power, the legislative power to raise 
money by taxation without regulation for the operat-
ing costs of government, is not applicable to this 
brief either and for that reason will not here be dis-
cussed, except as to later distinguish a revenue 
power license and tax, which is money-raising in 
nature, from a police power license and tax, which 
is regulatory in nature. 
Police power is inherent in the State and is the 
legislative exercise of the sovereign right of gov-
ernment within constitutional limitations to prohibit, 
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regulate, license, and tax in all regulatory fields of 
government to promote the order, safety, health, 
morals, and general welfare of the people through-
out the State. (Utah Const. art. I, § 7; C.J.S., Const. 
Law, § 175; State ex rel. Cox v. Board of Educ. of 
Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 401, 60 Pac. 1013 (1900).) 
Police power, being inherent in the State and 
reserved to the Legislature and people, except 
where expressly directed or permitted by the con-
stitutions, may not be limited, surrendered, or other-
wise delegated by the Legislature to the prejudice 
of the general welfare of the people throughout the 
State. (Utah Const. art. I, ~§ 2 and 7; Utah Const. art. 
V, § l; Revene v. Trade Comm'n, 113 Utah 155, 195 
P.2d 563 (1948); Western Leather & Finding Co. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 526 (1935); 
Utah Mfr's Ass'n v. Stewart. 82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 
229 (1933); State v. Goss, 79 Utah 559, 11 P.2d (1932); 
Retan v. Salt Lake City, 63 Utah 459, 226 Pac. 1095 
(1924); Salt Lake City v. Bernhagen, 56 Utah 159, 
189 Pac. 583 (1920); Young v. Salt Lake City. 24 Utah 
321, 67 Pac. 1066 (1902).) Nevertheless, the Utah Con-
stitution does expressly provide that the Legislature 
shall provide by general law for the incorporation, 
organization, and classification of cities that 
may remain ·legislative or become chartered (Utah 
Const. art. XI, § 5) without infringing on the consti-
tutional form of state government. (Larsen v. Salt 
Lake City, 44 Utah 437, 141 Pac. 198 (1914).) 
Chartered cities will not here be discussed with-
out specificity, because Salt Lake City is a legisla-
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tive city. (Rich v. Salt Lake City, No. 11117, D. Utah, 
Feb. 20, 1968.) And for that reason all further ref-
erences to cities in this brief are intended to relate 
to legislative cities. 
Cities are in their nature and purpose creatures, 
instrumentalities, or local agents of the State to 
exist, function, or be annihilated strictly at the will 
of the Legislature for the convenient administration 
of government throughout the State. Cities may ex-
ercise only those powers which have been express-
ly granted by the Legislature by general laws; those 
powers which are reasonably implied as being 
necessary to carry out those powers which have 
been expressly granted; and those powers which 
are essential to the declared objects and purposes 
of all cities alike created, not merely convenient, 
but absolutely indispensable. (16 C.J.S., Const. Law, 
§ 140(b); 62 CJS., Mun. Corps., s§ 107 and l lO(b); 37 
Am. Jur. 722; 1 McQuillin, (2d ed.) Mun. Corps., 
387; 1 Dillon, (5th ed.) Mun Corps., § 237, at 448; 
Utah Const. art. XI, § 5; Hepl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 
10-8-84 (1962); Rich v. Salt Lake City, No. 11117, D. 
Utah, Feb. 20, 1968; Salt Lake City v. Allred. 19 Utah 
2d 254, 430 P.2d 371 (1967); although reversed on 
rehearing, on point of preemption, Salt Lake City v. 
Allred. No. 10752, D. Utah, Feb. 9, 1968, wherein 
the cases of Kusse, Leo. Charlier. Hoffman. Howe. 
and Doran. infra, were cited with approval; Salt 
Lake City v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 359, 359 
P.2d 397 (1961); Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 7 Utah 
2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957); Ritholz v. Salt Lake City, 3 
Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955); Nasfell v. Ogden 
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City. 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 (1952); Nance v. 
Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 777 (1944); 
Duchesne County v. State Tax Comm'n, 104 Utah 36.S, 
140 P.2d 335 (1943); Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co .• 
97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939); Salt Lake City v. 
Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938); Riggins v. 
District Court of Salt Lake County. 89 Utah 183, 51 
P.2d 645 (1935); American Petroleum Co. v. Ogden 
City. 90 Utah 465, 62 P.2d 557 (1936); Utah Rapid 
Transit Co. v. Ogden City. 89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d 1 
(1936), although reversed on other grounds by Rich 
v. Salt Lake City. No. 11117, D. Utah, Feb. 20, 1968; 
Lehi City v. Meiling. 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935); 
Wadsworth v. Santaquin City. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 
161 (1933); Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas & Oil Co •• 
80 Utah 530, 15 P.2d 648 (1932); Bohn v. Salt Lake 
City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591, 81 A.LR. 215 (1932); 
Morgan v. Salt Lake City. 78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510 
(1931); American Fork City v. Robinson. 77 Utah 168, 
292 Pac. 249 (1930); Salt Lake City v. Sutter. 61 Utah 
533, 216 Pac. 234 (1923); Salt Lake City v. Bernhagen. 
56 Utah 159, 189 Pac. 583 (1920); Ogden City v. Leo. 
54 Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530 (1919); Salt Lake City v. 
Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City. 52 Utah 540, 175 
Pac. 654 (1918); Zamata v. Browning. 51 Utah 400, 
170 Pac. 1057 (1918); Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake 
City, 42 Utah 548, 134 Pac. 560 (1913); Tooele v. Hoff-
man. 42 Utah 596, 134 Pac. 558 (1913); American Fork 
v. Charlier. 43 Utah 231, 134 Pac. 739 (1913); Salt 
Lake City v. Doran. 42 Utah 401, 131 Pac. 636 (1913); 
Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay. 41 Utah 154, 125 
Pac. 389 (1912); Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 Utah 170, 
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106 Pac. 705 (1910), Ann. Cas. 1912 C 189; Kimball 
v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 Pac. 1, 45 LR.A. 
628 (1899); Nelden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 Pac. 524, 
77 Am. St. Rep. 917 (1899); Ogden City v. Boseman. 
20 Utah 98, 57 Pac. 843 (1899); Ogden City v. Cross-
man, 17 Utah 66, 53 Pac. 985 (1898); Ogden City v. 
Bear Lake & River, etc., Co., 16 Utah 440, 52 Pac. 697, 
41 LR.A. 305 ( 1898).) 
This view is well expressed in 1 Dillon (5th ed.), 
Mun. Corps. 154: 
It must now be conceded that the great weight of 
authority denies in toto the existence, in the ab-
sence of special constitutional provisions, of any 
inherent right of local self-government which is 
beyond legislative control. The Supreme Court of 
the United States has declared that a municipal 
corporation in the exercise of all its duties, includ-
ing those most strictly local or internal, is but a 
department of the State. The legislature may give it 
all the powers such a being is capable of receiv-
ing, making it a miniature State within its locality; 
or it may strip it of every power, leaving it a cor-
poration in name only; and it may create and re-
create these changes as often as it chooses, or it 
may itself exercise directly within the locality any 
and all the powers usually committed to a munici-
pality. So viewed its acts cannot be regarded as 
sometimes those of an agency of the State and at 
others those of a municipality; but, its character 
and nature remaining at all times the same, it is 
great or small according as the legislature shall 
extend or contract the sphere of its action. 
The City in this case now on appeal has never 
yet contended the law in this State to be contrary 
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to that which has been stated thus far in this brie~. 
In fact, the City relies solely on the combination of 
but three general laws for its specific statutory grant 
of express power to enact and enforce the Ordi-
nance: 
1. Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962); 
2. Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962); 
and 
3. Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 
1967). 
The City does not rely on its so-called general 
welfare powers which are to be found in Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1962). Therefore, absolute-
ly indispensable powers expressed in that statute 
will not here be discussed. Nor will there be need 
to distinguish the Allred or Kusse cases, supra, 
which on the surface, but surely would not in final 
analysis, seem to hold the general welfare powers of 
the City to be carte blanche without need for any of 
the other 84 express powers to be found in Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-1-85 (1962) or any of the 
other express powers to be found elsewhere 
throughout the general laws of the State (e.g., Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967)) or with-
in the constitutions. Suffice for now is to casually 
emphasize until there be need for more vigorous 
concern that the general grant of power to be found 
in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1962) is mere-
ly in aid of the special grants of express power else-
where to be found in the legislative statutes called 
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general laws which are required to have uniform 
operation throughout the State (American Fork City 
v. Robinson. 77 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249 (1930)) and 
does not enlarge or annul any special grant of ex-
press power. (Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 
P.2d 591, 81 A.LR. 215 (1932).) 
Of initial decisive significance is the need to re-
flect, recall, and remember well pertinent definitions 
while considering this matter on appeal. 
A careful reading should disclose an aware-
ness to the alert that the Ordinance attempts to reg-
ulate and license; that Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 
10-8-42 (1962) grants the express power to prohibit; 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962) grants 
the express power to regulate; and Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann.§ 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967) compels the manda-
tory duty to license but not to prevent. Caution 
should be exercised as these pertinent words are 
defined and applied with pertinent rules ofi statutory 
construction to the issues of this case. 
Prevent means to obstruct, hinder, or thwart 
beforehand, as an effective means to prohibit. United 
States v. Williams. 28 Fed. Cas. 631, 633 (1852); 
United States v. Souders. 27 Fed. Cas. 1267, 1269 
(1871); In re Maclauchlan, 9 F.2d 534, 535 (2d Cir. 
1925); In re Jones. 78 Ala. 419, 421 (1885); Random 
House Dictionary of the English Language (unabr. 
ed. 1966); Webster's New International Dictionary 
( unabr. 3d ed. 1966). 
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Prohibit means to forbid something from com-
ing into existence. (Ogden City v. Leo. 54 Utah 556, 
182 Pac. 530, 531, 5 A.LR. 960 (1919); Gordon v. City 
of Indianapolis. 204 Ind. 79, 183 N.E. 124 (1932); 
Simpkins v. State. 35 Okla. Crim. 143, 249 Pac. 168 
(1926); City of Butte v. Paltrovich. 30 Mont. 18, 75 
Pac. 521, 30 Am. St. Rep. 698 (1904); Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language (unabr. ed. 1966); 
Webster's New International Dictionary (unabr. 3d 
ed. 1966).) 
Regulate means to govern by rules of law 
something that is already in existence. (Salt Lake 
City v. Revene. 101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537, 539 
(1942); Carter v. State Tax Comm'n. 98 Utah 96, 96 
P.2d 727, 731, 126 A.LR. 1402 (1939); Ogden City v. 
Leo. 54 Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530, 531, 5 A.LR. 960 
(1919); Gordon v. City of Indianapolis. 204 Ind. 79, 
183 N.E. 124 (1932); Simpkins v. State. 35 Okla. Crim. 
143, 249 Pac. 168 (1926); Random House Dictionary 
of the English Language (unabr. ed. 1966); Web-
ster's New International Dictionary (unabr. 3d ed. 
1966).) 
License means to formally permit by lawful 
authority the doing of something that would be un-
lawful if done without the license. (Roe v. Salt Lake 
City. No. 10974, D. Utah, Jan. 23, 1968; Davis. v. 
Ogden City. 117 Utah 315, 215 P. 2d 616, 622, 16 
A.LR.2d 1208 (1950); Provo City v. Provo Meat & 
Packing Co .. 49 Utah 528, 165 Pac. 477, 479, Ann. 
Cas. 1918 D 530 (1917); Hom Moon Jung v. Soo, 64 
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Ariz. 216, 167 P.2d 929, 930 (1946); Blatz Brewing Co. 
v. Collins, 69 C~.l. App. 2d 639, 160 P.2d 37 (1945); 
Random House Dictionary of the English Language 
(unabr. ed. 1966); Webster's New International Die· 
tionary (unabr. 3d ed. 1966).) 
With the precaution of forever keeping in mind 
these pertinent definitions, let us now proceed to 
analyze the three statutes as they relate to the 
Ordinance. 
The first of the three statutes on which the City 
relies for its power to enact and enforce the Ordi-
nance is Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962), 
which provides: 
They [cities] may prohibit, except as provided by 
law, any person from knowingly having in his pos-
session any intoxicating liquor, and the manufac-
ture, sale, keeping or storing for sale, offering or 
exposing for sale, importing, carrying, transporting, 
advertising, distributing, giving away, exchanging, 
dispensing or serving of intoxicating liquors. (Em-
phasis added.) 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) was 
enacted in this form in 1925 (Sess. Laws of Utah, ch. 
11, § 1) and has never since been expressly amend-
ed. Nor until now has the City ever relied on this 
sta_tute for any power at all to the City to regulate 
and license locker clubs. 
Applying pertinent definitions of prohibit, reg-
ulate, and license, gla.ringly disclosed is the realiza-
tion that the express power to prohibit liquor, as 
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statutorily granted in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 
10-8-42 (1962), is no power at all to the City to reg-
ulate liquor, as attempted by the Ordinance. Nor 
is the express power to prohibit liquor, as statutorily 
granted in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962), 
any power at all to the City to license liquor, as at-
tempted by the Ordinance. 
Furthermore, the express power to prohibit 
liquor, as statutorily granted in Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962), is no power at all to the City to 
regulate liquor and license liquor, as attempted by 
the Ordinance, beca11se that which is prohibited is 
unlawful. And that which is unlawful cannot be reg-
ulated and licensed. It may only ,be prohibited 
prevented, and policed. (Davis v. Ogden City, 
117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, 622, 16 A.L.R.2d 
1208 (1950); Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 
124 P.2d 537, 539 (1942); Carter v. State Tax Comm'n, 
98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727, 731, 126 A.LR. 1402 (1939); 
Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530, 53 l, 
5 A.LR. 960 (1919); Provo City v. Provo Meat & Pack-
ing Co., 49 Utah 528, 165 Pac. 477, 479, Ann. Cas. 
1918 D 530 (1917); Simpkins v. State, 35 Okla. Crim. 
143, 249-Pac. 168 (1926); City of Butte v. Paltrovich, 
30 Mont. 18, 75 Pac. 521, 30 Am. St. Rep. 698 (1904).) 
Still furthermore, the express power to prohibit 
the sale and certain uses of liquor as statutorily 
granted in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-42 (1962), 
is no power at all to the City to regulate and license 
for the consumption of liquor or beer, as attempted 
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by the Ordinance, because neither consumption nor 
beer are expressed in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 
10-8-42 (1962). And all grants of power to cities are 
to be strictly construed to the exclusion of implied 
powers that are not reasonably necessary to carry 
out express powers and implied powers that are not 
absolutely indispensable to carry out the purposes 
of the City. (Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 
P.2d 507 (1952): Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden 
City, 89 Utah 546, 58 P.2d 1 (1936), although reversed 
on other grounds by Rich v. Salt Lake City, No. 
11117, D. Utah, Feb. 20, 1968; American Fork City v. 
Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 Pac. 249 (1930); 62 C.J.S. 
Mun. Corps. §§ 119, 135, and 139.) And the power of 
the City should be denied if there is reasonable 
doubt that the power has been granted. (Nance v. 
Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944); 
Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 
58 P.2d 1, 3 (1936), although reversed on other 
grounds by Rich v. Salt Lake City, Civil No. 1117, 
D. Utah, Feb. 20, 1966; 1 Dillen, Mun. Corps. § 23'1 
(5th ed. 1911); 62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. §§ 119, 135, and 
139. 
One final observation relating to Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-12 (1962), granting the power to 
prohibit, certain named activities of liquor, except 
as provided by law. Every single activity of liquor 
as expressed in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 
(1962) is elsewhere statutorily lawful ... as provided 
by law. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. tit. 32 (1966); 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-10-1, 11-10-2, 
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11-10-3, and 11-10-4; 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, 16-
6-13.3 (1962).) Therefore, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-8-42 (1962), granting power to prohibit, except 
as provided by law, is no power at all to the City to 
even prohibit the activities of liquor expressed in its 
own provisions. 
Vve must now analyze Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-8 l (1962) and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967), the last two of the three stat-
utes on which the City relies for its power to enact 
and enforce the Ordinance, as we decide whether 
tho State has reserved to itself alone its inherent 
and plenary police power to regulate liquor. 
The spiE'cifics of these statutes will later be more 
fully disclcsed and discussed. For now, however, 
their general provisions are of more import to con-
cerned attention. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 10-8-81 (1962) pro-
vides the City may regulate all social clubs. Rep~. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967) provides 
the City shall license but not prevent all clubs which 
allow the consumption of liquor by the members 
on the premises. And the Ordinance purports to 
regulate and license all nonprofit clubs but attempts 
to regulate and license locker clubs only. 
In determining whether the State has reserved 
to itself alone its inherent and plenary police pow-
er to regulate liquor, notwithstanding Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-42 and 10-8-81 (1962) and 
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11-10-1 (Supp. 1967). legislative interpretation of 
statutes, though not necessarily binding on this 
Court, is entitled to weight. (Salt Lake City v. Towne 
House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 442 
(1967).) A glance at the history of legislative inter-
prntation of statutes relating to the inherent and 
plenary police power of the State and how it may 
be and has been delegated to the City may prove 
to be helpful in this instance as it has in others. 
(Zamata v. Browning, 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 
(1918).) 
When the Mormons arrived on the 24th day of 
July 1847 to what is now called the State of Utah, 
the area then belonged to Mexico. With very few 
others ever being present from 1847 to 1850, the 
Mormons were self-governed with Brigham Young 
as their leader by_ the gospel of their religious faith. 
(Bible, King James Version, so far as translated cor-
rectly; Book of Mormon: Pearl of Great Price; and 
Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints.) Liquor was regulated 
during these first years by the Doctrine and Cove-
nants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, Words of Wisdom, § 89. 
In 1850, the United States purchased the area 
and crealed it into a temporary government called 
the Territory of Utah. (United States Congressional 
Act, Sept. 9. 1850, Utah Code Ann. Vol. I, at 74 (1953).) 
From 1850 until 1882, there seems to have been 
neither special nor general territorial acts granting 
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any express police power to regulate liquor. Dur-
ing these territorial days, cities were incorporated 
under special charters that constitutionally met the 
peculiar needs and desires of each city. Almost 
every special charter granted its city the express 
power to prohibit, regulate, license, and tax any 
and all activities of liquor. (Zamata v. Browning. 51 
Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 (1918).) Therefore, the Terri-
tory had not from 1850 until 1882 reserved to itself 
alone its inherent and plenary police power to reg-
ulate liquor. Nor had the Territory granted its coun-
ties that power. 
In 1882, the Legislative Assembly of the Terri-
tory of Utah by a special territorial act amended the 
special charter of Salt Lake City, grantng the city 
the power to regulate, license, and tax the manufac-
ture, sale, gift, or other disposition of spirituous, 
vinous, malt, or other intoxicating liquors and the 
power to restrain, prohibit, and punish same if done 
without a license and the further power to prohibit 
same on Sundays, public holidays, and election 
vinous, malt, or other intoxicating liquors and the 
days. (Laws of Utah 1882, ch. 3.) Also in 1882, the 
Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah by a 
general territorial act granted the counties similar 
power. (Laws of Utah 1882, ch. 28.) 
Except for general laws enacted in 1884 repeal-
ing all special charters and providing for the incor-
poration of cities and towns thereafter to be by gen-
eral laws (Comp. Laws of Utah 1884, § 1775), these 
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liquor laws enacted in 1882, with only slight 
changes from time to time, continued in force 
throughout the remaining territorial days until state-
hood in 1896 (Laws of Utah 1882, chs. 2 and 28; Laws 
of Utah 1884, § 1775, subd. 41; Laws of Utah 1888, § 
1775, subd. 41) and from statehood in 1896 until 1911 
(Rev. Stat. of Utah 1898, § 206, subd. 41; Comp. Laws 
of Utah 1907, § 206, subd. 41). These statutes were 
the forerunners of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 
10-8-42 ( 1962) and generally provided that the City 
had the power to prohibit, regulate, license, and tax 
liquor. 
Therefore, neither the Territory from 1850 until 
1896 nor the State from 1896 until 1911 had reserved 
to itself alone its inherent and plenary power to reg-
ulate liquor. 
In 1911, for the first time in Utah, the people 
residing in cities, towns, and counties had a right 
to vote on the issue of liquor within their respective 
boundaries without longer entrusting this decision 
to their respective local commissions or past legis-
latures. 
The Local Option Act of 1911 provided for the 
division of each county in the Sta:te into voting units 
for the purpose of determining whether or not the 
sale of liquor therein should be permitted. Each 
city and each town constituted a separate unit, and 
the remainder of the county constituted another 
unit. (Sess. Laws of Utah 1911, ch. 106, § 48.) 
If the people of a unit voted for the sale of 
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liquor, the commission could not by ordinance pro-
hibit the sale of liquor. The commission would in 
that case have only the power to regulate and li-
cense the sale of liquor. If the people of a unit voted 
against the sale of liquor, the commission could not 
by ordinance regulate and license the sale of liquor. 
The commission would in that case have only the 
power to prohibit the sale of liquor. (Sess. Laws of 
Utah 1911, ch. 106, § 61.) 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) was 
expressly amended in 1911, during the same ses-
sion, to comply with the Local Option Act, by th8 
Legislature deleting the word and and inserting the 
word or. (Sess. Laws of Utah 1911, ch. 106 § 41) The 
1911 amendment to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-
8-42 (1962) then granted to the cities that had voted 
again~t the sale of liquor only the power to prohibit 
the sale of liquor and to the cities that had voted 
for the sale of liquor only the power to regulate and 
license the sale of liquor. As then amended, Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962), comprehen-
sively regulating liquor, superseded all legislation 
and city ordinances on the subject of liquor and 
placed the burden on the cities to exercise their re-
spective powers by enacting future ordinances in 
compliance ·with powers granted by the 1911 gen-
eral laws of the State. (Sess. Laws of Utah 1911, ch. 
106, subd. 68: Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay. 41 
Utah 154, 160, 125 Pac. 389 (1912); Nephi City v. 
Forrest. 41 Utah 433, 126 Pac. 332 (1912).) This illus-
trates the very well established and fundamental 
rule of law that the Legislature has inherent and 
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plenary police power to enact, amend, or repeal 
any and all grants of power to cities. (See all author-
ities cited on pp. 9, 10, and 11 of this brief.) 
Elections under the Local Option Act of 1911 
resulted in the peopleo f most units voting against 
the sale of liquor. Only a scattered few voted for 
the sale of liquor. With this as its guide, the 1917 
Legislature enacted the first, and thus far the only, 
State Prohibition Act, taking effect August 1, 1917. 
(Sess. Laws of Utah 1917, ch. 2, § 40.) 
The State Prohibition Act of 1917 expressly pro-
hibited liquor within the entire State of Utah and 
thereby expressly repealed the Local Option Act of 
1911 and all other acts and parts of acts in conflict 
with its terms. (Sess. Laws of Utah 1917, ch. 2, § 39.) 
The people of cities no longer had the right to vote 
for or against the sale of liquor, and the City Com-
missions no longer had the power to regulate and 
license the sale of liquor. The State of Utah in 1917 
was statutorily bone dry. This further illustrates the 
very well established and fundamental rule of law 
that the Legislature has inherent and plenary police 
power to enact, amend, or repeal any and all grants 
of power to cities. (See all authorities cited on pp. 
9, 10, and 11 of this brief.) 
To be consistent the Legislature, while enacting 
State Prohibition Act of 1917, expressly providing 
that all acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith to 
be repealed, should have repealed expressly Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) expressly 
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amended in 1911 by withdrawing from the cities the 
alternative power to regulate and license and by 
retaining the sole power to prohibit liquor. The 1917 
Legislature, however, did not do its housekeeping 
as thoroughly as did the 1911 Legislature by amend-
ing expressly this statute to conform with the parent 
statute. As amended by implication, however, Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 ( 1962) after 1917 
granted the cities only the restricted power to pro-
hibit and withdrew from the cities the previously 
granted power to regulate and license liquor. (Za-
mata v. Browning. 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 (1918); 
State v. Frederic, 28 Ida. 709, 155 Pac. 977 (1916).) 
In 1917, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 
(1962). being construed as the express power grant-
ed to the City to only prohibit liquor, was not to be 
construed as a mandate by the State to the cities 
to enforce only the State Prohibition Act of 1917. 
With this construction, and with the aid of the gen-
eral welfare clause of cities (Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-84 (1962)), the cities could then prosecute 
as misdemeanors prohibition violations relating to 
liquor in their own courts under their own ordi-
nances, retaining their own collections of fines, so 
long as those ordinances conformed to this statute 
and were not in conflict with the other general laws 
of the State. For example, under this construction, 
the City could not pass an ordinance making the 
sale of liquor a misdemeanor if the sale of liquor un-
der state law was an indictable misdemeanor. (Za-
mata v. Browning. 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 (1918); 
State v. Frederic. 28 Ida. 709, 155 Pac. 977 (1916).) 
25 
It would appear that the State Prohibition Act 
of 1917 represented the trend of the march through-
out the entire ccmntry to effect total prohibition of 
liquor, because the Federal Prohibition Act was 
passed by Congress December 3, 1917, only four 
months and two days following the State Prohibition 
Act of 1917. The Federal Prohibition Act, being rati-
fied January 29, 1919, and taking effect December 
29, 1920 (U.S. Const. amend. XVIII), repealed all fed-
eral. state, county, city, town, and all other laws 
throughout the 1?ntire United States of America per-
taining to liquor. Liquor was absolutely prohibited 
throughout all of the United States. \A/ithout doubt, 
at this point of time, December 29, 1920, Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) was in fact repealed, 
notwithstanding the fact that its express language 
remained unaltered, because Congress and the sev-
eral states had concurrent power to enforce the 
Federal Prohibition Act by appropriate legislation 
(U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, § 2) to be subsequently 
enacted. 
In 1925, the State complied with this constitu-
tional directory by expressly amending and enact-
ing Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962). The 
1925 amendment and enactment deleted from the 
1911 statute the words or regulate and license and 
inserted the words except as provided by law. so 
that the 1925 amendment as then enacted expressly 
granted cities the power only to prohibit liquor, ex-
cept as provided by law. As was earlier discussed 
in depth, it is abundantly clear that Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962), granting only the power 
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to prohibit liquor, grants the City no power at all 
that would deny that the State has reserved to itself 
alone its inherent and Plenary police power to 
requla te liquor. 
It is of decisive significance at this phase of leg-
islative history to again reflect, realize, and remem-
ber well that it was that verv same Legislature of 
1925, by enacting Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-
42 (1962) in its present express terms, withdrew from 
the City ail power to regulate and license liquor 
and at the very same session, by ena_cting Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962), which provides: 
They [cities] may regulate all social clubs, recrea-
tiona! associations, athletic associations and kin-
dred associations, whether incorporated or not, 
which maintain club rooms or regular meeting 
roo:·ns or regular meeting rooms within the cor-
po;:ate limits of the city. (Emphasis added.) 
Applying the rules of strict, limited, and narrow 
construction, as so persistently and as so authorita-
tively required by this Court (all authorities cited on 
pp. 9. 10, and il of this brief), Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann. ~ 10-8-81 (1952), grantir;g the City the power to 
regulate all social clubs, grant no power at all 
to the City to regulate liquor, because no implied 
power to "regulate liquor is reasonably necessary 
to carry out the eYpress power granted to regulate 
.-::11 social clubs a.nd because no implied power to 
regulate liquor is absolutely indispensable to carry 
out the objects ond purposes of the City. At least 
for these reasons in 1925, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
~§ 10-8-42 nor 10-8-81 (1962) granted the City any 
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power at all that would deny that the State had re-
served to itself alone its inherent and plenary police 
power to regulate liquor. (See all authorities cited on 
pp. 9, 10, and 11 of this brief.) 
At least for these reasons, the 1925 Legislature 
did not intend to grant any power at all to the City 
to regulate liquor. Therefore, the State in 1925 had 
rese:ved to itself alone its inherent and plenary 
police power to regulate liqUor. (See all authorities 
cited on pp. 9, 10, and 11 of this brief.) 
Another reason why the 1925 Legislature did 
not intend to grant any power at all to the City to 
regulate liquor was because liquor was prohibited 
in 1925 from being anywhere present within the 
State and Nation. That which is prohibited is unlaw-
ful, and that which is unlavdul cannot be regulated. 
It may only be prohibited, prevented, and 
policed. (Davis v. Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 21.S 
P.2d 616, 622, 16 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1950); Salt Lake City 
v. Reven3, 101 Utah 504 .. 124 P.2d 537, 539 (1942); 
Carter v. State Tax Comm'n, 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727, 
731, 126 A.LR. 1402 (1939); Ogden City v. Leo, 54 
Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530, 531, .s A.LR. 960 (1919); Provo 
City v. Provo Meat & Packing Co., 49 Utah 528, 165 
Pc:c. 477, 479, Ann. Cas. 1918 D 530 (1917); Simpkins 
v. State, 35 Okla. Crim. 143, 249 Pac. 168 (1926); 
City of Butte v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. 18, 75 Pac. 521, 
30 Am. St. Rep. 698 (1904).) Therefore, the 1925 Legis-
lature did not intend to grant the City any unconsti-
tutional or statutorily unlawful power at all to reg-
ulate liquor. 
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Still another reason why the 1925 Legislature 
did not intend to grant any power at all to the City 
to regulate 1iquor was because the locker clubs 
which are the sole collective target of the Ordinance 
had not as yet in 1925 even been contemplated, con-
ceived, or created. These statutorily peculiar locker 
clubs did not exist until created by the 1955 Legis-
lature. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 
16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962).) 
State a.nd federal prohibition continued until 
December 5, 1933, when the Federal Prohibition Act 
was repealed, returning to the several states their 
inherent and plenary police power to prohibit, reg-
ulate, and license liquor. (U.S. Const. amend. XXU 
Therefore, by supreme constitutional mandate in 
1933, the State had reserved to itself alone its in-
herent and plen'.:uy police power to regulate liquor, 
notwithstanding the express power granted to the 
City to regulute all social clubs as provided in 1925 
by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962). 
Following the repeal of the Federal Prohibition 
Act, at the very next session of the Legislature, the 
St::tte Prohibition Act of 1917 was likewise repealed, 
by the Legislature enacting the Liquor Control Act 
of 1935, taking effect March 25, 1935, expressly re-
serving to the State itself alone its inherent and 
plenJry police p0wer to prohibit, regulate, and li-
cense all alcoholic beverages, including light beer, 
heavy beer, wine, and liquor (Sess. Laws of Utah 
1935 ch. 43), notwithstanding the express power 
granted to the City to regulate all social clubs as 
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provided in 1925 by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
l '1-8-81 ( 1962). 
One reason why the 1935 Legislature intended 
to reserve to the State itself alone its inherent and 
plenary police power to prohibit, regulate, license, 
and tax liquor is first evidenced by the title to the 
Liquor Control Act, which provides for a system of 
state control of all alcoholk beverages. (Sess. Laws 
of Utah 1935, ch. 43.) 
Another reason why the 1935 Legislature in-
tended to reserve to the State itself alone its inherent 
and plenary police power to regulate, license, and 
tax all alcoholic bbeverages is further evidenced by 
some. but by no means all, of the very numerous 
details relating to the police power to regulate, li-
cense, and tax that are to be found in the various 
sections of the original Liquor Control Act. For ex-
ample, the State has reserved to itself alone its in-
herent and plenary police power to regulate and 
license, as attempted by the Ordinance, all liquor 
and beer wherever consumed (§ 6(e)), licensed (3 
6(1)), and regulated (§ 7), as attempted by the Ordi-
nance, sold, possessed, used (§ 6(f)), kept (§ 6(i)), 
stored(§ 9(p)), dispensed (§a76), bonded (§ 76), had 
(§ 115), disposed (§ 180), given (§ 180), etc., etc., etc. 
The detail with which liquor and beer have 
been covered is not to be found in other statutes 
dealing with other matters. Courts construing stat-
utes of this nature have generally held that the 
State has reserved to itself alone the inherent and 
plenary police power to regulate liquor and beer. 
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(Riggins v. District of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 
51 P.2d 645 (1935): Mc>"yor v. Randall, 67 Ariz. 369, 
196 P.2d 477 (1948); People v. DeYoung, 39 Cal. Rptr. 
598 (Super. Ct. 1964), aff' d, 39 Cal. Rptr. 487 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 1964); City of Miami v. Kichinko, 22 So.2d 
627 (Fla. 1945); Anderson v. Nick, 402 Ill. 
508, 84 N.E.2d 394 (1949); City of Pineville v. Tarver, 
231 La. 446, 91 So.2d 597 (1956); State v. Haswell, 414 
P.2d 652 (Mont. 1966); City of Lyndhurst v. Compola, 
169 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960); Munoz v. City 
of San Antonio, 318 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. 1958).) 
Still another reason why the 1935 Legislature 
never intended either Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 
10-8-42 (1962) or Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 
(1962) as any power at all for the City to enact and 
enforce the Ordinance is further evidenced by other 
of the the many provisions of the original Liquor 
Control Act of 1935. For further example: Sheriffs 
of the several counties have the duty to enforce the 
provisions of the Liquor Control Act within incor-
porated cities and towns with the same diligence 
as within territory in their respective counties out-
side of cities and towns (§ 205); and all other officials 
within the entire State have the duty to enforce the 
provisions of the Liquor Control Act; i.e., all city, 
county, precinct and state executive, prosecuting 
and peace officers are expressly charged with the 
enforcement of the provisions of the Liquor Controi 
Act (§ 206). 
And still another reason why the 1935 Legisla-
ture never intended either Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
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Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) or Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-8-81 ( 1962) as any power at all for the City to 
enforce and enact the Ordinance is the same reason 
why no Legisla_ture between 1925 and l 935 ever 
intended any such power, and that is because the 
locker clubs which are the sole collective target of 
the Ordinance had not as yet during those years 
even been contempla.ted, conceived, or created. As 
drnady stated, but to restate, these peculiar 
locker clubs did not exist until created by 
the 1955 Legislature. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962).) 
Next to be determined is whether any Legisla-
ture since 1935 has ever intended either Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962); Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962) as any power at all for 
the City to enact and enforce the Ordinance. 
In 1937, the Legislature granted cities the ex-
press power to prohibit, regulate, license, and tax 
the retail sale of light beer. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann. § 32-4-17 (1966).) No such grant of power pres-
ently exists for liquor. Therefore, neither Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 (1962) nor Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962) is any grant of power at 
all for the City to enact and enforce the Ordinance. 
because a well established rule of construction is 
that, in the absence of any express statutory pro-
vision to the contrary, the enumeration of some 
powers within a subject (e.g., those relating to the 
retail sale of light beer, an alcoholic beverage) im-
plies the exclusion of all other powers within that 
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subject (e.g., those relatinCJ to liquor, also an alco-
holic beverage). (62 C.T.S. Mun. Corps. § 120; City 
of Tulsa, Okla. v. Midland Valley R.R., C.C.A. Okla., 
168 F.2d 252; Arnold v. City of Chicago, 387 Ill. 532, 
56 N.E.2d 795; City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 
Ill. 347, 45 N.E.2d 852, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 756, 63 
Sup. Ct. 1175, 87 L. Ed. 1709; Van Eaton v Town of 
Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N.W. 475, 71 A.LR. 820, 
43 C.J. 197, n. 19.) 
From 1935 until 1951, the maintenance by non-
profit clubs of private lockers in which members 
stored liquor which had been lawfully purchased 
c.nd which had been brought there individually by 
the members to their lockers and which clubs per-
mitted the members to consume liquor on the prem-
ises while engaged in usual club activities was not 
in violation of the liquor Control Act declaring to 
be nuisances places where people gathered to con-
sume liquor (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 32-8-46 and 
32-8-47 (1966)); nor in violation of the Liquor Control 
Act declaring to be unlawful the consumption of 
liquor in a public building, park, or stadium (Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-13 (1966)). (State v. Alta 
Club. 120 Utah 121, 232 P.2d 759 (1951).) 
From 1935 until 195S, the maintenance of such 
a system as the iocker clubs was known to the State 
Liquor Control Commission, and frequent inspec-
tions of the clubs were made by law enforcement 
officers of that commission. State Liquor Control 
Commission having its own law enforcement offi-
cers is an added reason why the Legislature intend-
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ed that the State reserved to itself alone all of its 
inherent anci plenary police power to regulate 
liquor. An opinion was rendered by the Office of 
the Attorney General in 1945 holding the locker 
clubs system was in vicilat]on of the law. Also in 
19115, the Senate of the Legislature conducted an in-
vo:::tlgation of the workinqs of the then liquor control 
~ystem during which investigations of the locker 
system then in vogue was brought to its attention. ln 
1947, in response to an inquiry of a state senator, the 
Attorney General again stated his belief that such 
system was not in violation of the law. In another 
letter addressed to a legislator in 1949, the Attorney 
Gsneral, wferring to certain inconsistencies in the 
Li.::ruor Control Act, stated that there was a serious 
doubt a.s io the legality of the locker system and 
ridded: 
"We cannot refrain from respectfully expressing 
the hope that the Le::;islature will clarify the situa-
tion in this regard." 
Despite this knowledge and advice, the Legislature 
did not from 1935 to 1951 enact any statute specific-
ally making the locker club system illegal. (State v. 
Alta Club, 120 Utah l/,l, 232 P.2d 759 (1951). Follow-
ing the Alta Club case, supra, in 1951 until 1955, the 
locker clubs were still left without governmental 
regulation because their conduct with liquor was 
not made illegal. 
The 1955 Legislature, however, amended Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 16-6-13; enacted §§ 16-6-13.l, 
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16-6-13.2, and lG-6-13.3; a.nd retained~~ !Go~( G.nJ 
16--6-15 (1962); statutorily providing that the locker 
clubs shall be legal in this State only when operated 
in compliance with the 1955 Locker Club Law, there-
by intendinq to reserve to itself alone all of its in~ 
horent and plenary police power to regulate and 
license for the general welfare of the people 
throughout the State. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 
16-6-13.1 (1962).) 
Every socir"J.l club, recreational or athletic asso-
ciation or kindred association (identical terms as 
some with:n certain provisions of the Ordinance), 
i.e., every locker club which was already then in-
corporated or which wr:..s to be incorporated under 
corporated or which were to be incorporated under 
the provisions of the 1955 Locker Club Law and 
which allowed the storage and consumption oi 
liquor by the members and the serving of liquor by 
club personnel on the premises, were to be legal 
after 1955 only if they complied to the 1955 Locker 
Club Law. (Repl. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-13.1 (1962).) 
The locker clubs are required to procure, 
file, and maintain a good and sufficient bond in the 
amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), approved 
by the Secretp_ry of State (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-6-13.1 (1962).) The locker clubs are required 
to file with the Secretary of State a copy of 
their constitution; bylaws, and house rules, all of 
wh~ch contain, among other things, the fourteen 
n:rovisions as enumerated in the 1955 Locker Club 
Law. (Repl. Vol. UL:1h Code Ann§ 16-6-13.1 (1962).) 
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All then existing social clubs, recreational or 
·::C ihletic associations or kindred associations (identi-
cal terms as some with certain provisions of the 
Ord)n::rnce) which were already incorporated were 
rT:mte:::l thirty days to comply with the terms of the 
l %S Locker Club Law. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
~ l 6-6-13.2 ( 1962).) All statutes or parts inconsistent 
with the 1955 Locker Club Law were thereby re-
pealed. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 16-6-13.3 (1962).) 
All peace officers throughout the State were statu-
torily granted the right to enter the club rooms or 
meeting rooms of social clubs, recreational or ath-
letic associations or kindred associations (identical 
terms as some within certain provisions of the Ordi-
nance) which complied with the 1955 Locker Club 
L:iw for the purpose of determining whether any 
laws were being violated therein. (Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann. § 16-6-14 (1962).) Any persons knowingly 
incorporating under the provisions of the 1955 
Locker Club Law with the object of pecuniary profit 
and all persons having possession of any charter 
revoked by the Secretary of State under the 1955 
Locker Club Law and refusing upon demand to de-
liver up such charter so revoked are guilty of a mis-
demeanor and shall be punished by a fine in any 
sum not exceeding Two Hundred Dollars ($200) or 
by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 
thirty days or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
(Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-15 (1962).) 
Locker clubs being social establishments and 
subject to regulation (Entre Nous Club v. Tronto, 4 
Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955), the 1955 Locker Club 
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Lak must have uniform because it is the adoption of 
very comphhensive measures, providing that the 
State has reserved to itself alone its inherent and 
plenary police power to regulate and license liquor 
in locker clubs. The 1955 Locker Club Law granting 
no express power to the City to enact and enforce 
the Ordinance, therefore, implies the City is without 
any power at all to enact and enforce the Ordinance. 
(Kent Club v. Tronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 
(1957) Any without any power to regulate and lic-
ense locker clubs. 
The 1955 Locker Club Law, an amendment to 
the 1935 State Liquor Control Act, became another 
vehicle through which the Legislature intended to 
reserve to itself alone Hs inherent and plenary police 
power to regulate and license liquor in locker clubs. 
Certain duties were reposed in the Secretary 0f 
State both in issuing charters to locker clubs 
when the requlrements of the law are met 
and inforfeiting them when there is a failure 
to comply there w it h. (Entre Nous Club v. 
Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98. 287 V2d 670 (1955); Citizen's 
Club v. Welling .. 83 Utah 81, 27 P.2d 23 (1933), cited 
and approved in Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 
67, 305 P.2Q. 870 (1957).) The locker clubs owe their 
existence to the State. (Young Constr. Co. v. Dunne, 
123 Kan. 176, 254 Pac. 323 (1927); Four-S Razor Co. v. 
Guymon, 110 Kan. 745, 205 Pac. 635, cited in Kent 
Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957).) 
The powers and privileges of the locker clubs are 
conferred on conditions imposed by the Legislature 
when the locker cluhs accept their charters and 
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consent to the conditions imposed by the Legisla-
ture. The 1955 Locker Club Law itself then becomes 
a part of the corporate contract called a charter to 
be issued by the State itself to such locker clubs 
without any express statutory mention of cities, 
thereby implying the exclusion of any power being 
granted to the City to enact and enforce the Ordi-
nance (Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 
870 (1957).) 
It should be remembered that the keeping of 
liquor and permitting its use is of such a nature 
that it is directly related to the public morals and 
welfare so that the regulation of the manufacture, 
transportation, sale, and use (e.g., consumption) of 
alcohol and other intoxicating liquors is an exercise 
of the inherent and plenary police power of the 
State unless and until the State clearly intends to 
grant any of its police power to cities or other quali-
fied agents. (Utah Mfr's Ass'n v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 
23 P.2d 229 (1933), cited and approved in Kent Club 
v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957).) 
The enactment of subsequent legislation (1955 
Locker Club Law) containing a specific grant of 
power (to the Secretary of State to regulate and li-
cense liquor in locker clubs) which power is kindred 
to that contained in prior legislation (Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962), the second of the three 
statutes on which the City relies for its power to en-
act and enforce the Ordinance), the prior legislation 
containing a general grant of power (to regulate all 
social clubs, enacted in 1925 when liquor was pro-
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hibited in the State and Nation) usually suggests 
conclusion that the subsequent specific gran 
power (to the Secretary of State to regulate 
license liquor in locker clubs) in the subseq1 
legislation (1955 Locker Club Law) was not inclu 
within the prior qeneral grant of power (City to 
ulate all social clubs) in the prior legislation (F 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 10-8-81 (1962).) (Salt Lake 
v. Towne House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 
P.2d 442 (1967), wherein this Court held that the 
may regulate and license nonprofit social club~ 
der the authority as presently granted by Repl. 
Utah Code Ann. ~ 10-8-81 (1962); that the 1955 Lo 
Club Law established a procedure for the SecrE 
of State to regulate locker clubs; and althougl: 
issue wa.s neither presented nor decided, that, 
haps, the State had reserved to the State itself a 
its inherent and plenary police power to reg1 
and license liquor in locker clubs.) 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962) 
acted in 1925, though never since expressly am 
ed, was amended by implication by the Legislc 
enacting the 1935 State Liquor Control Act (] 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. tit. 32 (1966)) and again b~ 
acting the 1955 Locker Club Law (Repl. Vol. 
Code Ann.§§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, and 16-E 
(1962).) The earlier and latter statutes cannot by 
reasonable interpretation be reconciled so as t 
enforceable as a harmonious whole, becausE 
latter statutes reserve to the State itself its inhE 
and plenary police power to regulate liquor ( 
v. Rives, 40 Utah 47, 119 Pac. 1034 (1911), cited 
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approved in Salt Lake City v. Towne House Ath-
letic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 442 (1967)); and 
for the further reason that they conflict by the earlier 
statute granting the City the power to provide by 
the Ordinance for the revocation of license of priv-
ileges granted by the State by charter to be regu-
lated by the State itself alone through the Secretarv 
of State and not by the City Commission, all of which 
would constitute an unconstitutional infringement 
on the right of contract if permitted to stand in viola-
tion of the due process clauses of both constitutions. 
(U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV; Utah Const. art. I, 
§ 7.) (Salt Lake City v. Allred, No. 10752, D. Utah, 
Feb. 9, 1968; Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 
P.2d 671 (1938); 62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. § 143(b).) 
For these and other reasons desired or required, 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962) grants the 
City no power to regulate liquor, that which the 
State has reserved to itself alone as an exercise of its 
inherent and plenary police power. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-42 and 10-8-8i 
(1962), the first and second statute on which the City 
relies, having failed to grant the City any power a.t 
all to enact and enforce the Ordinance, we must 
now analyze Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 
(Supp. 1967), the last of the three statutes on which 
the City relies to determine whether this statute 
grants the City any power at all to enact and enforce 
the Ordinance. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967), 
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when first enacted in l gsg, provided: 
Cities and towns within the corporate limits, and 
counties outside of corporate cities and towns shall 
license all establishments, associations and corpora-
tions, except nonprofit corporations bonded and 
regulated und::T provisions of sections 16-6-13.1 
16-6-13.2 and 16-6-13.3, Utah Code Annotated 195~ 
as enacted by Chapter 25, sections 2, 3, and 4, Lawi 
of Utah 1955, that operate a club, business or asso 
ciation which allows the customers, members 01 
guests to possess or consume liquor on the premises 
provided the license does not permit the licensee 
operator or employee of either to hold, store, o 
possess liquor on the premises. However, nothing i1 
this section shall be construed to prevent person: 
other than the licensee, operator or employees o 
either, from possessing and consuming, but not stor 
ing, liquor on premises, except as otherwise pro 
vided for by statute. (Emphasis added.) 
Although legislative interpretation of sta 
is not necessarily binding on this Court, it is en 
to weight. (Salt Lake City v. Towne House Atl 
Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 422 (1967).) Then 
this Court should give weight to the legislativ 
terpretation of statutes expressed by the 1959 l 
lature. 
The Legislature, enacting the so-called 
Set-up Law, the forerunner of Repl. Vol. Utah ( 
Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967), the last of the threE 
utes on which the City relies for its power to 1 
and enforce the Ordinance. in very precise 
pointed terms, as it excepted the locker clubs 1 
from, statutorily expressed the legislative intE 
tation of all three statutes (Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
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~~ 10-8-42, 10-8-81, and 11-10-1 (1962) and that in 1959 
no one or any combination of the three granted any 
power at all to the City to enact and enforce the 
Ordinance, because the State had reserved to itself 
its inherent and plenary police power to regulate 
c nd license liquor in locker clubs. 
Although executive interpretation of statutes is 
not necessarily binding on this Court, it is entitled 
to weight. (State v. Alta Club, 120 Utah 121, 232 
P.2d 759 (1951), 82 C.J.S., Statutes, 901.) Therefore, this 
Court should give weight to the executive interpre-
tation until 1967 of the three statutes on which the 
City relies for is power to enact and enforce the Ord-
inance (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-42, 10-8-81, 
and 11-10-1 (1962), but the City never before enact-
ing the Ordinance until 1967 ever attempted to reg-
ulate and license the locker clubs for the consump-
tion of beer and liquor by the members on the 
premises. The City must admit this executive inter-
pretation, but it is contending in this matter now 
on appeal before this Court that the 1967 Legisla-
ture granted the City for the first time the power to 
regulate and license liquor in locker clubs by its 
amending and enacting Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967) by deleting from the 1959 Set-
up Law the express words which had before 
excepted the locker clubs that were regulated and 
licensed by the 1955 Locker Club Law, which ex-
pressed the legislative interpretation that the State 
had reserved to itself alone its inherent and plenary 
police power to regulate and license liquor in locker 
clubs. 
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We must now analyze Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 11-10-l (Supp. 1967), the last of the three stat-
utes on which the City relies for its power to enact 
and enforce the Ordinance, which provides: 
Cities and towns within the corporate limits, and 
counties outside of corporate cities and towns shall 
license all establishments, associations and corpora-
tions, that operate a club, business or association 
which allows the customers, members or guests to 
possess or consume liquor on the premises, pro-
vided the license does not permit the licensee, op-
erator or employee of either to hold, store, or 
possess liquor on the premises. However, nothing 
in this section shall be construed to prevent persons 
other than the licensee, operator or employees of 
either, from possessing and consuming, but not 
storing, liquor on the premises, except as other-
wise provided for by statute. (Emphasis added.) 
Assuming, but not admitting, that the 1967 Leg-
islature intended Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 
11-10-1 (Supp. 1967) to apply to the locker clubs, we 
must apply pertinent definitions to determine what 
powers at all this statute grants to the City o enact 
and enforce the Ordinance. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967) 
expressly provides that cities shall license for the 
consumption of liquor. No power is granted to pro-
hibit. Therefore, this statute is of no comfort to the 
City as an aid to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-42 
(1962), which grants the power to prohibit. Nor is 
any power granted to regulate. Therefore, this stat-
ute is of no comfort to the City as an aid to Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § l 0-8-81 (1962) which express-
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1y grants the power to regulate. Of course, both 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-8-42 and 10-8-81 
(1962), the first two of the three statutes on which 
the City relies for its power to enact and enforce the 
Ordinance, having been earlier repealed as here 
before discussed, neither could later be revived by 
this or any other statute. (Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
~ 63-3-5 (1959): Lagoon Jockey Club v. Davis County, 
72 Utah 405; 270 Pac. 543 (1928).) 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 11-10-1(Supp.1967), 
by the use of the mandatory words shall license and 
shall not prevent, compels the City to license all 
places for the consumption of liquor that fall within 
its terms and meet the four licensing qualifications 
that are required by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. ~ 
11-10-2 (1962). No power is granted to prohibit the 
consumption of liquor, because the power to pro-
hibit includes the power to prevent (Ogden City v. 
Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 Pac. 530, 531, 5 A.L.R. 960 
(1919)), and there is not here any power to prevent. 
No power is granted to regulate the Consumption 
of liquor, because the power to regulate includes 
the power to prohibit and prevent to some degree 
the activity that is continued to be regulated. (Og-
den City v. Leo, 54 Utah .556, 182 Pac 530, 531, 5 
A.LR. 960 (1919; Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 
504, 124 P.2d 537, 539 (1942); State ex reL Hollywood 
Jockey Club v. Stein, 133 Fla. 530, 180 So. 863; City 
of Tacoma v. Keisel, 68 Wash. 685, 124 Pac. 137, 139 
(1912); Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75, 
186 P.2d 556 (1947).) 
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With clarity and brevity a challenge is here 
made to any and all to discover and disclose any 
statutory grant of power by the Legislature to the 
City to regulate liquor in the State of Utah. There 
being no such grant of power, it must be admitted 
as apparent that the State has reserved to itself alone 
its inherent and plenary police power to regulate 
liquor, thereby depriving the City of any power to 
enact and enforce the Ordinance which attempts 
to regulate liquor. 
POINT II 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST VAGUENESS. 
Section 20-29-1 of the Ordinance attempts to 
define a nonprofit club: 
A non-profit club as used in this section shall be de-
fined to be any social club, recreational or athletic 
association whether incorporated or not which 
maintains club rooms, regular meeting rooms or 
facilities within the city limits. 
This section is unconstitutionally vague. Its un-
certainty affords no standard guidelines for its en-
forcement. There is no meaningful definition of the 
word nonprofit; e.g., absence of purpose for pecuni-
ary gain is not even mentioned. 
The Statute relied on by the City for its granted 
power to pass this Ordinance (Repl. Vol. Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962).) does not include the phrase 
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or facilities that is included in this definition in the 
Ordinance. The Statute includes club rooms or reg-
ular meeting rooms only. The Statute does not in-
clude ... or facilities. If neither club rooms nor reg-
ular meetings rooms were maintained, the use of 
the word or, in the disjunctive sense, reduces the 
definition within this section to a nonprofit club that 
maintains facilities. Without facilities being defined, 
the provision is vague; and would permit discrim-
nation toward those who would maintain club 
rooms or regular meeting rooms, as against those 
clubs that do not maintain club rooms or regular 
meeting rooms, but do maintain facilities other than 
club rooms or regular meeting rooms. And, even 
with facilities being defined, the inclusion of facili-
ties, in addition to club rooms or regular meeting 
rooms, would amount to an unlawful attempt by 
the City to exercise powers not expressly granted, 
causing this Section to be invalid. (See all authorities 
on pp. 9, 10 and 11 of this brief.) 
This section is also otherwise fatal to the Ordi-
nance, because every other section is dependent 
on thiss ection for its competent application in at-
tempting to determine just what nonprofit club is 
to be regulated and licensed. 
Nonprofit clubs are defined by the expressed 
general laws of the State of Utah. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-19(3) (Supp. 
1967) provides: 
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The words ''nonprofit corporation" means a corpora-
tion no part of the income of which is distribut-
able to its members, trustees or officers, or a non-
profit co-operative association. 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-21 (Supp. 1967) 
provides: 
Corporations whose object is not pecuniary profit 
may be organized under this act for any lawful 
purpose ... social ... athletic ... recreational ... 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-13 (1962) pro-
vides: 
... any social dub, rcreational or athletic associa-
tion, or kindred association, incorporating under the 
provisions of this chapter, that such club or asso-
ciation ... the object of which is not for pecuniary 
profit ... . 
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-13.1 (1962), in 
addition to the definition in § 16-6-13, includes those 
clubs that are bonded and regulated by the State 
(not City) to operate as what are commonly referred 
to as the locker clubs. 
The City has no power to enact nor enfotce 
this Ordinance, as an attempt to regulate and license 
locker clubs, · because the Ordinance is re-
pugnant to the general laws of the State (Utah Const. 
art. XI, § 5; Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-81 (1962); 
Jones v. Logan City, 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 
(1967); State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 
12 (1961).) 
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POINT III 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST DISCRIMINA-
TION. 
Sections 20-29-2, 20-29-3, 20-29-4, 20-29-5, 20-29-6, 
20-29-7, 20-29-8, 0-29-9, 20-29-10, 20-29-11, 20-20-19, 
and 20-29-24 of the Ordinance in question are un-
constitutionally discriminatory. 
Section 20-29-2 of the Ordinance in question 
provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any non-profit club to op-
erate within Salt Lake City without first obtaining 
a license. 
Section 20-29-2 is unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory as it pertains to any nonprofit club. The City 
has not purported to license all nonprofit clubs; yet 
this Ordinance does not purport to license nonprofit 
clubs which permit consumption of liquor only. 
Yet, still, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 
1967), as relied on by the City, provides expressly 
that cities shall license . . . consumption of liquor 
only. No more! Consumption of beer is not included. 
in the statute. Neither does the Ordinance purport 
to regulate and license the unincorporated. nonprofit 
clubs which do not maintain club rooms, regular 
meetings rooms, or facilities; instead, the Ordinance 
purports onlv to regulate and license incorporated 
clubs called locker clubs. 
This section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
and also void as being repugnant to the general 
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laws of the State. (See authorities cited under Point 
II of this Brief, p. 46; Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann~ 
(1962); Repl. §§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, 16-6-3.3 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 1-10-1 (Supp. 1967); Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-10-2, 11-10-3, 11-10-4 (1962); 
and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. tit. 32 (1966); where-
in the State has preempted the field of liquor at-
tempted to be entered by the City.) 
Sections 20-29-3, 20-29-4, 20-29-5, 20-29-6, 20-29-7, 
20-29-8, 20-29-9. 20-29-11, and 20-29-19 of the Ordi-
nance in question are unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory by their attempt to classify the operations and 
determine different fees for each of three classes; 
while each class relates to the common class of con-
sumption only; and while the common class of con-
sumption only relates to the vaguely defined class 
of all nonprofit clubs. The Ordinance is unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory in the further sense that by 
its own definition, nonprofit clubs are purported to 
be licensed and regulated whether incorporated or 
not; yet applicants for Class "C" licenses are re-
quired to be incorporated by the State; as being 
nonprofit, bonded ($5,000 cash). chartered, and reg-
ulated by the State (not regulated by the City); un-
der the provisions of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
16-6-13, 16-6-13..1, 16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962); 
and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-6-19(3) and 
16-6-21 (Supp. 1967). Those not so qualifying, i.e., 
all places except locker clubs, are permitted by the 
City under the provisions of Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, (1965) tit. 9, ch. 4, without meet-
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ing any of the qualifications enumerated in Section 
19 of the Ordinance, to have consumption of liquor 
on the premises by the payment of a $50 per year 
license fees. 
The Ordinance in these respects is unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory, repugnant to, and not uni-
form with the general laws of the State, as found 
within but not limited to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 10-8-42, 10-8-81, and 10-8-84 (1962); Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 967); Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann.§§ 11-10-2, 11-10-3, and 11-10-4 (1962); Laws 
of Utah 1963, ch. 17, § 2(1); Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, et al. within ch. 6 
(1962); Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. tit. 32 (1966); Utah 
Const. art. XI, §5; art. I,§ 7; art. I, § 12; art I, § 24; art. 
I, 27; U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV; and Rev. Ord. 
S.L.C. Utah tit. 19, chs. 1 -25 (1965). 
None of the alleged authority offered by the 
City in this case grants the City the power to dis-
criminate, and within the discriminated classes, no 
less. Nor does any of the alleged authority offered 
by the City in this case grant the City the power to 
regulate and license the locker clubs by this Ordi-
nance. The Ordinance charges one class $1; pro-
vided, neither the consumption of beer nor the con-
sumption of liquor is permitted on the premises. It 
charges another class $200; provided, the consump-
tion of beer only is permitted on the premises. No-
where has the State granted the City any power to 
license for the consumption alone of beer alone. It 
charges another class $250; provided, both the con-
sumption of beer and the consumption of liquor are 
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permitted on the premises. It charges $1 if beer is 
sold; provided, neither the consumption of beer nor 
the consumption of liquor is permitted on the prem-
ises. And it charges absolutely nothing; provided, 
the consumption of liquor only is permitted on the 
premises. The Ordinance is unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory against the Locker Clubs et al. (Roe v. 
Salt Lake City, Civil No. 10974, D. Utah, Jan. 23, 1968) 
and amounts to an unconstitutional infringement on 
the rights of contract of the State, by its charter to 
the locker clubs, and by the attempt through this 
Ordinance by the City to revoke State chartered 
activities. The City may not prohibit that which the 
State permits. (Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 41 
Utah 154, 160, 125 Pac. 389 (1912); Zamata v. Brown-
ing, 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac. 1057 (198).) Nor may the 
City regulate and license that which the State has 
preempted to itself. (Riggins v. District of Salt Lake 
County, 89 Utah 83, 51 P.2d 645 (1935).) Cities have 
only those powers granted by the State. (Wads-
worth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 
(1933); and many, many other Utah cases, as cited 
in Point L pp. 9, 10, and 11 of this brief. 
Section 20-29-10 of the Ordinance is un-
constitutionally discriminatory, as being violently 
repugnant to the general laws of the States as enum-
erated throughout Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, 16-6-13.3 (1962); Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 (Supp. 1967); and Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-10-2, 11-10-3, and 11-10-4 
(1962). These Statutes clearly provide all the neces-
sary requirements for receiving a charter from the 
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State to operate the locker clubs, which are reg-
ulated by the State; and for receiving a license from 
the City for the consumption alone of liquor alone. 
The Ordinance can require no more from the locker 
clubs, if any at "111, than it requires from the other 
places that permit the consumption alone of liquor 
alone. 
Section 20-29-1 g of the Ordinance in question is 
unconstitutionally discriminatory and repugnant to 
the general laws of the State of Utah, by requiring 
more qualifications than are required by Repl. Vol. 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-2 (1962) for the consumption 
alone of liquor alone, as the State has by mandate 
compelled that the City shall license every place 
that permits the consumption of liquor on the prem-
ises. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST INFRINGE-
MENT ON CONTRACT. 
Sections 20-29-3, 20-29-4, 20-29-5, 20-29-6, 20-29-9, 
c:tnd 20-29-23 of the Ordinance in question amount 
to a collective unconstitutional infringement on the 
rights of contract of the State, by its charter to the 
locker clubs, and by the attempt through this Ordi-
nance by the City to revoke State chartered activi-
ties. (U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 and Utah Const. art. I, § 
18.) 
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The City may not prchibit that which the State 
permits. (Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 41Utah154, 
160, 125 Pac. 389 0912); Zamata v. Browning. 51 Utah 
400, 170 Pac. 1057 (19l8).) Nor may the City regulate 
and license that which the State has preempted to 
itself. (Riggins v. District of Salt Lake County. 89 
Utah 83, 5 P.2d 645 (1935). Cities have only those 
powers grnnted by the State. (Wadsworth v. Santa-
quin City. 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933); and many, 
many other Utah cases, as cited in Point I, pp. 9, 10, 
and 11 of this brief. 
By the issuance of a State charter, contractual 
rights and duties are created. Only the parties to 
that contract may revise its terms and conditions, 
and even they must afford due process to all. The 
City may not frustrate the policy or the rights of the 
State or the locker clubs. Any attempt by the City 
to refuse to license or suspend or revoke the char-
tered privilege granted by the State would be un-
constitutional and void in every respect. (U.S. Const. 
art I, § 10; Utah Const., art I,~ 18; and Repl. Vol. Utah 
Code Ann.§§ 16~6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, and 16-6-13.3 (1962).) 
POINT V 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIM-
INATION. 
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Sections 20-29-7 and 20-29-9 unconstitutionally 
violate the right against self-incrimination (U.S. 
Const. amend. V and Utah Const. art. I, § 2), by re-
quiring the production of financial statements. (Mar-
chetti v. United States, 388 U.S. 904, No. 2, Jan. 29, 
1968.) 
POINT VI 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL R I G H T AGAINST ILLEGAL 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. 
Sections 20-29-7 and 20-29-9 unconstitutionally 
violate the right against illegal searches and seiz-
ures (U.S. Const. amend. IV and Utah Const. art. I, 
§ 14), by requiring a key for entry for unlimited use 
without consent or warrant. (Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L. ed. 2d 930 
(1967). 
And Section 20-29-20 unconstitutionally violates 
the right against illegal searches and seizures (U.S. 
Const. amend. IV and Utah Const. art I, § 14), by 
requiring without consent or warrant the right of 
entry to any peace officer for the purpose of his de-
termining whether any laws or ordinances are be-
ing violated and . . . to make periodic inspections 
of the premises, reporting his findings to the Board 
of Commissioners. (Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, L. ed. 2d 930 (1967).) 
54 
POINT VII 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE CONST: 
TUTIONAL RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS 0 
LAW. 
Section 20-29-22 unconstitutionally violate 
right against due process of law (U.S. Const. am 
V and XIV), by its use of the conjunction am 
making the locker clubs and others named, c 
of a misdemeanor, even though only one, no 
or more, might have in fact intended only to 
mit, or did in fact intend to and did commit th 
or even though two or more did not consp: 
commit the act that one only did in fact comm 
act. 
This Section 20-29-22 unconstitutionally vii 
the due process of law (U.S. Const. amends. \ 
XIV and Utah Const. art. I, §~ 7, 10, and 12), by 1 
ing the locker clubs the presumption of innoc 
right to trial by jury, right to be confronted l 
witnesses against them, etc., etc., etc., ... ar 
denying the State and/or the locker clubs thE 
form operation of all laws of a general nature. 
Const. art. I, § 24; Christensen v. Harris, 109 U 
163 P.2d 314 (1945): Untermeyer v. State Tax 
m'n, 102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942).) 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court should l 
versed with a declaratory judgment by this 
55 
against the City (Defendant-Respondent); denying 
the City any power to enact or enforce the Ordi-
nance, and permanently restraining the enforce-
ment of the Ordinance. 
Dated this 6th day of March, 1968. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ROBERT J. STANSFIELD 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
AN ORDINANCE 
AN ORDINANCE ADDING Section 29 to Title 
20 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 
1965, relating to the regulation of non-profit clubs 
and associations. 
Be it ordained by the Board of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake City, Utah: 
SECTION 1. That a new section be added to 
Title 20 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 1965, to be known as Section 20-23-1 through 
20-29-25, relating to the licensing and regulation of 
non-profit clubs and associations, be, and the same 
hereby is, to read as follows: 
Section 20-29-1. Definitions. 
A non-profit club as used in this section shall 
be defined to be any social club, recreational or 
athletic association or kindred association whether 
incorporated or not which mains club rooms, reg-
ular meeting rooms or facilities within the city 
limits. 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstihlt1onally vague. Its un-
A-2 
certainty affords no standard guidelines for its en-
forcement. There is no meaningful definition of the 
word nonprofit; e.g. absence of purpose for pecuni-
ary gain is not even mentioned. 
Beer. "Beer" means any beverage containing 
not less than one-half of one per centum of alcohol 
by weight and obtained by the alcoholic fermentr:i.-
tion of an infusion or decoction of any malted grain, 
or similar products, and which contains not more 
than three and two-tenths per centum of alcohol by 
weight and may or may not contain hops or other 
vegetable products and includes ale, stout or porter. 
Liquor. "Liquor" means and includes alcohol, 
or any alcoholic, spirituous, vinous, fermented, malt 
or other liquid or combination of liquids, a part of 
which is spirituous, vinous, or fermented, and all 
other drinks or drinkable liquids, containing more 
than one-half of one per centum of alcohol by 
weight; and all mixtures, compounds or prepara-
tions, whether liquid or not, which contain more 
than one-half of one per centum of alcohol by 
weight, and which are capable of human consump-
tion; except t0.at the ter m"liquor" shall not include 
"beer" as herein defined. 
Section 20-29-2. It shall be unlawful for any 
nonprofit club to operate within Salt Lake City with-
out first obtaining a license. 
Observation by State 
.s Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
~rtains to any nonprofit club. The Ordinance 
:s to regulate and license all nonprofit clubs; 
ttempts to regulate and to license only some 
fit clubs. 
------ -- --------
ction 20-29-3. Non-profit club licenses issued 
the provisions of this chapter shall be classi-
o the following types of operations and shall 
he privileges and responsibilities hereinafter 
ed in this chapter: 
Class ''A'' 
Class "B'' 
Class "C" 
Observation by State 
iis Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
attempt to classify the operations and deter-
:lifferent fees for each of three classes; while 
:lass relates to the common class of consump-
nly. 
~ction 20-29-4. A Class "A" license shall ap-
all non-profit clubs which do not allow the 
mption of beer or intoxicating liquors on or at 
emises. 
A-4 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
for the same reasons as those stated in Observation 
by State under Section 3. 
Section 20-29-5. All applications for a Class 
"A" license shall at the time of application file with 
the licenses assessor and each time the license is 
renewed a statement indicating the elected officers 
and directors of the club. 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
for the same reasons n.s these stated in Observation 
by State under Section 3. 
Section 20-29-6. A Class "B'' license shall ap-
ply to all non-profit clubs which allow the consump-
tion of beer in containers but not intoxicating liquor 
at or on premises. 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
for the same reasons as those stated in Observation 
by State und9r Section 3. 
-------------·-------
Section 20-29-7. All applications for a Class "B" 
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license shall at the time of application file with the 
license assessor and each time the license is re-
ne\llred a verified statement incorporating the re-
quirements of Section 5 of this chapter and in addi-
'tion thereto list the managing directors or person-
nel and their salaries, location of all facilities oper-
ated by the club and a financial statement for 
the prior year of operation, and that the officers, 
directors, managing personnel and employees have 
complied with the requirements and possess the 
qualifications specified in the Liquor Control Act 
of the State of Utah and if entrance to the premises 
or facilities of the club is only by use of a key or 
other device then a key or such device must be 
supplied to the chief of police, and that the sale of 
beer will be made to members and guests only. 
The statement shall be executed by the president, 
chief officer or managing director of said club. 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
for the same reasons as those stated in Observation 
by State under Section 3. It is also unconstitutional 
as a violation of the right against self-incrimination. 
by requiring the production of financial statements; 
and the right against illegal searches and seizures, 
by requiring a key for entry for unlimited use with-
out consent or warrant. 
Section 20-29-8. A Class "C" license shall ap-
ply to all non-profit clubs which allow the consump-
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tion of beer in containers and intoxicating liquori 
or at their facilities or premises. 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitl1tionally discriminate' 
for the same reasons as those stated in Observati1 
by State under Section 3. 
Section 20-29-9. All applications for a Class"( 
license shall at the time of application file with u 
license assessor and each time the license is : 
newed a verified statement incorporating the: 
quirements of Secs. 5 and 7 of this chapter and 
addition thereto shall submit a copy of its constr 
tion, bylaws and house rules, and each club sh: 
abide by and conform to said constitution, byla1 
and house rules. The constitution, bylaws a: 
house rules shall provide among other things: 
"(l) That all classifications of members m 
be admitted only on written application and or 
after investigation and approval by the governr 
body. Such admissions must be duly recorded 
the official minutes of a regular meeting of the g. 
erning body. 
"(2) Standard of eliqibility for members. 
"(3) Limitation on the number of members c 
sistent with the nature and purpose of the club 
association. 
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"(4) Reasonable initiation fees and dues con-
sistent with the nature and purpose of the club or 
association. 
"(5) The period for which dues shall be paid 
and the date upon which such period shall expire. 
"(6) Reasonable regulations for the dropping 
of members for the non-payment of dues or for 
other causes. 
"(7) Strict regulations for the government of 
association or club rooms and quarters generally 
consistent with the nature and character of the as-
sociation or club. 
"(8) That rooms and quarters must be under 
the supervision of a manager or house committee, 
who shall be appointed by the governing body of 
the association or club. 
"(9) Provisions for visitors and for the issuance 
and use of guest cards, which shall be issued for a 
period of not to exceed two weeks. A record of the 
issuance of each such card shall be maintained and 
available for the inspection by the license assessor 
at all times. 
"(10) That the sale of food and beverages by 
any such club or association must be conducted by 
the club or association itself and in its own right 
and not upon any concession basis either to any 
member of the club or association or to .any third 
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party. 
"(11) That no member, officer, agent or em-
ployee of any such club or association shall be paid 
or directly or indirectly receive, in the form of sal-
ary or otherwise, any revenue from the operation 
of the club or association beyond the amount of 
such reasonable compensation as may be fixed or 
voted by the proper authorities and in accordance 
with the constitution and bylaws of the club or asso-
ciation. 
"(12) That said club or association shall not 
engage in any public solicitation or public adver-
tising ofo pen house activities, banquets, cocktail 
hours or similar functions. 
"(13) That all property of said club or associa-
tion shall belong to all the members thereof in com-
mon. 
"(14) That each club or association shalt in its 
own name, own or lease premises suitable for its 
activities. If leased premises are occupied by said 
club or association the lease must be for at least a 
twelve month period. A copy of the lease shall be 
filed with the license assessor." 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
for the same reasons as those stated in Observation 
by State under Section 3. It is also unconstitutionally 
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discriminatory, as being repugnant to the general 
laws of the State, by requiring qualifications for a 
license that were not required by the granting pow-
er relied on for the lkense, and by not requiring 
any of the four qualifications that were required by 
the granting authority relied on. (Age, citizenship, 
character, and record in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
~ 11-10-2 (1962). Further, the Ordinance is unconstitu-
tional and void for the added reason that it amounts 
to an infringement on the right of contract. By the 
issuance of a State charter, contractual rights and 
duties are created. Only the parties to that contract 
may revise its terms and conditions, and even they 
must afford due process to all. The City may not 
frustrate the policy or rights of the State or the 
Locker Clubs. Any attempt by the City to refuse to 
license, or to suspend or revoke the chartered priv-
ilege grunted by the State would be unconstitu-
tional and void in every respect. (U.S. Const. art. I, 
2 l 0; and Utah Const. art. I, § 18.) 
-------- ----~- ----
Section 20-29-10. Each non-profit club to quali-
fy under this ch.=:i.pter must supply to the license as-
sessor or his agents immediate access to its books 
for the purposes of ascertaining whether the club 
is in fact a non-profit organization or whether it is 
operating for and realizing a pecuniary profit. 
Observation by State 
This section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
as being violently repugnant to the general 
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laws of the State as enumerated throughout Repl. 
Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-13.2, 
16-6-13.3 (1962); Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-1 
(Supp. 1957); and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
11-10-2, 11-10-3, and 11-10-4 (1962). These statutes 
clearly provide all the necessary requirements for 
receiving a charter from the State to operate the 
Locker Clubs, which are regulated by the State; and 
for receiving a license from the City for the con-
sumption alone of liquor alone. The Ordinance can 
require no more from the locker clubs, if any at all, 
than it requires from the other places that permit 
the consumption alone of liquor alone. 
Section 20-29-11. If at any time it is determined 
tha.t the club is in fact operating for pecuniary profit 
the license issued under this chapter hall be sus-
pended and the club required to procure the vari-
ous business and regulatory licenses enumerated 
in the ordinances of Salt Lake City which apply co 
the operation of the club. 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
for the same reasons a.s those stated in Observation 
by State under Section 3. 
--------------
Section 20-29-12. It shall be unlawful for any 
non-profit club to operate without complying strict-
ly with the health ordinances and regulations of 
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Salt Lake City as set forth in the title relating to 
he::i.lth regulations. 
Section 20-29-13. It shall be unlawful for any 
non-profit club to operate without complying strict-
ly with the fire code of Salt Lake City, as set forth 
in the ordinances relating to !ire prevention. 
Section 20-29-14. It shall be unlawful for a club 
holding a Class "C" license to operate a locker sys-
tem for the storage and serving of intoxicating 
liquor unless organized as a non-profit corporation 
pursuant to Chapter 6, Title 16 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. All peace officers are 
given the express right to confiscate without the 
prior issuance of a writ or warrant of such confisca-
tion, any liquor in any types of containers which 
are stored on the premises of a club that is not 
properly labeled as to ownership or stored in a 
member's locker and to which no one claims title. 
Section 20-29-15. The license shall be issued 
upon the filing of an application to the City License 
Assessor. All applications filed in accordance with 
t;1e provisions of this chapter shall be referred to 
~he chief of police for inspection and report. The 
chief of police shall within ten days after receiving 
s.~ch 0pplication forward a report to the Board of 
Commissioners as to the general reputation and 
character of the persons who habitually frequent 
such place, whether such club is conducted in a 
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lawful, quiet and orderly manner, the nature and 
kind of entertainment if any at such place, whether 
gambling is or has been permitted on the premises 
or by any member, officer or director at their place 
and the proximity of the premises to any church or 
school. 
Section 20-29-16. All applications filed in ac-
cordance with this chapter shall be referred to the 
health department who shall inspect all premises 
owned and operated by the club to assure sanitary 
compliance with the laws of the State of Utah, the 
ordinances of Salt Lake City and the rules and req-
ulations of 1he health department. 
Section 20-29-17. It shall be unlawful for any 
club to maintain any premises or facilities without 
complying with the following lighting and view re-
quirements: 
(1) During business hours a mm1mum of 5 
candle power light measured at a level of five feet 
above the floor shall be maintained. 
(2) No enclosed booths, blinds or stalls shall 
be erected or maintained. 
(3) A clear, unobstructed view of all portions 
of the interior shall be available at all times from a 
point within the licensed premises at or near the en-
trance to ea_ch room. 
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Section 20-29-18. It shall be unlawful for the 
club acting through its employees or managing di-
rector holding a Class "B'' or Class "C" license and 
any employee, member, guest club officer or direc-
tor to: 
(a) Have in his possession beer or intoxicating 
liquor contrary to state statutes. 
(b) Sell beer or intoxicating liquor in violation 
of state statute. 
(c) Supply beer or intoxicating liquor to any 
person under the age of twenty-one years. 
(d) Permit drunkeness to take place in or on 
any of the club premises or facilities. 
(e) Permit any person under the age of twenty-
one years to remain in or about the lounge or bar 
area of the premises or facilities of the club. 
(f) Supply beer or liquor to an intoxicated per-
son. 
(g) Serve or mix beer or liquor on or at the 
premises or facilities or knowingly permit any per-
sons to consume beer or liquor on the premises and 
facilities between the hours of one a.m. and seven 
a.m. of any day, except when New Years Day falls 
on Monday, then until three a.m. 
(h) Permit the use of the premises for any un-
lawful purpose. 
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Section 20-29-19. Each club that maintains on 
its premises such facilities for the playing of cards 
or other games of chance shall so indicate in its ap-
plication to the license assesor the number of tables 
and type of paraphernalia to be so used and the lo-
cation on the premises. 
---------~--
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitutionally discriminatory 
and repugnant to the general laws of the State of 
Utah, by requiring more qualifications than are re-
quired by RepL Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 11-10-2 (1962) 
for the consumption alone of liquor alone, as the 
State has by mandate compelled that the City shall 
license every place tha1. permits the consumption 
of liquor on the premises. 
Section 20-29-20. Any peace officer shall have 
the right to enter the club room, meeting rooms, 
premises and facilities of non-profit clubs for the 
purpose of determining whether any laws or ordi-
nances are being violated therein and in the case 
of clubs holding Class "B" or Class "C" licenses, 
the police department shall make periodic inspec-
tions of said premises and reports its findings to the 
Board of C0mmissioners. 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitutional, as a violation of 
the right against illeqal searches and seizures, pro-
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tected by the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
Section 20-29-21. Any existing non-profit club 
shall have thirty days after the effective date of this 
ordinance to comply with the terms hereof. Pro-
viding, however, that any club having operated 
under a prior license from the city in providing any 
services or facilities which are prohibited under this 
chapter may continue to so provide said services 
end facilities so long as they remain at the premises 
Jcscr]bed in the prior licenses. 
Section 20-29-22. The provisions of this chap-
ter may be enforced by injunctive relief and in ad-
dition thereto, the club and any member, guest, em-
ployee, agent, manager, director and officer is found 
to violate any provision of this ordinance is guilty 
ot c: misdemeanor. 
Observation by State 
This Section is unconstitutional, as against due 
process, by its use of the conjunction and, by mak-
ing the Locker Clubs and others named, guilty of 
a misdemeanor, even though only one, not two or 
more, might have, in fact, committed the act. (U.S. 
Const. amends. V and XIV.) 
Section 20-29-23. Licenses may be suspended 
or revoked by the Board of Commissioners for the 
'violation of any provision of this title or any other 
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applicable ordinance or law relating to alcoholic 
beverages. The Commission shall prior to revoca-
tion conduct a public hearing upon not less than 
ten days notice to the club by serving notice of the 
hearing upon any officer or director thereof. 
Observation by State 
This Section is an unconstitutional infringement 
on right of contract, by attempting to suspend or re-
voke the privilege proposed by the license. It is re-
pugnant to the general laws of the State of Utah. 
(Rpel. Vol. Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-6-13, 16-6-13.1, 16-6-
13.2, 16-6-13.3 (1962); Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 
11-10-1 (Supp. 1967): and Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 11-10-2 and 11-10-3 (1962).) 
Section 20-29-24. License fees. Applications 
provided for in this chapter shall be accompanied 
by the fees hereinafter provided which fee shall be 
deposited in the City Treasury if the license is 
granted and returned to the applicant if denied: 
For Class "A" license $1.00 per annum or any 
part thereof. 
For Cla·ss "B" license $200.00 per annum or any 
part thereof. 
For Class "C" license $250.00 per annum or 
any part thereof. 
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Observation by State 
This Section is lmconstitutionally discriminatory 
for the same reasons ets those stated in Observation 
by State under Section 3. 
Section 20-29-25. All ordinances or parts there-
of inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. If 
any section or provisions of this chapter shall be 
declared invalid or unenforceable by any court of 
competent jurisdiction the remainder of the act shall 
not be affected thereby. 
SECTION 2. In the opinion of the Board of 
Commissioners it is necessary to the peace, health 
and s:i.fety of the inhabitants of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
that this ordinance become effective immediately. 
SECTION 3. This ordinance shall take effect 
upon its first publication. 
Passed by the Board of Commissioners this 
......... day 0£.. .............................................. , 1967. 
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